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TWO YEARS LATER  
AND COUNTING: 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF  
THE SUPREME COURT’S  
TAXING POWER DECISION  
ON THE GOALS OF  
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT* 
HON. ALBERTO R. GONZALES** 
DONALD B. STUART, ESQ.*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, in a highly anticipated decision, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a requirement that most Americans obtain health 
insurance or pay a monetary penalty.1  The statute in question that contained this 
requirement, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Act or ACA), often 
labeled as “Obamacare,” or the Affordable Care Act, was a monumental piece of 
legislation (over 900 pages) that was passed by Congress and signed into law by 
President Barack Obama in 2010.2  The Act represented a significant overhaul of 
the country’s health care system and structure.  The primary objectives of this 
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 1. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter National 
Federation].   
 2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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legislation were to expand the number of individuals covered by health insurance 
and decrease the overall cost of health care in the country.3   
Some have referred to the components of the Act as a three-legged stool: (1) 
make health insurance coverage available through Medicaid expansion and 
insurance reforms,4 (2) require everyone to buy health insurance and provide 
subsidies to help pay the costs,5 and (3) decrease reimbursement for providers (such 
as hospitals) to help fund expanded coverage.6  Without all three components 
working together, some experts believe it is unlikely that the reforms under the Act 
will work.7 
Upon its passage by Congress and the President’s signature, the Act 
immediately fell into legal challenge and wound its way through various federal 
district courts and courts of appeals.8  Finally, on a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court reviewed 
certain key provisions of the Act and issued a decision on June 28, 2012.9  The two 
provisions of the Act subject to constitutional challenge were the individual 
mandate, requiring individuals to purchase a minimum level of health insurance or 
pay a penalty, and the expansion of Medicaid, including the increase in funds 
provided to the states conditioned on such states’ participation in the Medicaid 
expansion.10   
 
 3. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (requiring most individuals to maintain a certain 
basic level of health care, thereby expanding the pool of insured individuals and lowering overall 
costs); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 (Supp. V 2006) (enacting specific provisions to save 
Americans money on health insurance). 
 4. See, e.g., Aaron Carroll, Stools Need More Than Two Legs, THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST 
(Nov. 11, 2010, 9:41 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/stools-need-more-than-
two-legs/ (describing the three legs as the expansion of coverage, the Individual Mandate, and tax 
subsidies); see also Susan Cancelosi, What To Do, What To Do: Employer Health Benefit Plans 
During and After 2012’s Uncertainty, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 569, 572–73, 587 (2013) (noting 
prohibitions on denial of coverage for pre-existing conditions and provisions that grant allowances 
for college-age students to be covered by their parents’ insurance). 
 5. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (implementing the Individual Mandate); 42 U.S.C. § 18083 (Supp. 
V 2012) (providing for subsidies). 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–17 (Supp. V 2012) (implementing provisions for evidence-based 
reimbursement structures that tie payment to the quality of performance). 
 7. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 4 (explaining that the Individual Mandate creates the 
financial base for expanded coverage while the subsidies enable individuals to afford buying 
health insurance). 
 8. On the day signed into law, thirteen states filed a complaint against the Act in the Federal 
District Court for the Northern District of Florida.  Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and 
Human Serv., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom, Fla. ex 
rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011);  see 
13 Attorneys General Sue Over Health Care Overhaul, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-23-attorneys-general-health-suit_N.htm. 
 9. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). 
 10. Id. 
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Under the individual mandate, most residents of the United States will need to 
have health insurance coverage by January 1, 2014 or face a financial penalty that 
could, when fully phased in, range from $695 to $12,500 depending on the 
individual’s filing status and number of dependents.11  The Supreme Court’s 
majority upheld the individual mandate as part of Congress’s “taxing power” under 
the Constitution.12  The Court held that the penalty under the individual mandate, 
otherwise known as the “shared responsibility payment,” may be reasonably 
imposed as a “tax” on individuals under the taxing power of Congress.13  The Court 
found that even though the individual mandate was motivated by a regulatory 
purpose, it was nonetheless acceptable because an individual may choose to act and 
buy health insurance or not act and pay the financial penalty (tax).14  The Court 
stated that it was not its role to decide the “wisdom or fairness” of such a tax, only 
the constitutionality of it.15 
The expansion of Medicaid as originally enacted required that states receiving 
federal Medicaid funding substantially expand their Medicaid programs.16  In order 
to continue to receive Medicaid funds, states would have been required to provide 
healthcare to all qualifying adults with income up to 133% of the Federal Poverty 
Level (FPL).17  Although Medicaid funding is optional, all fifty states receive it.18  
Further, although federal funds have been allocated to support the expansion, after 
2016, states are required to fund a portion of the Medicaid expansion themselves.19  
States that did not wish to expand their Medicaid programs under the original Act 
would have lost all federal Medicaid funding, including funding for Medicaid 
programs in place since the program’s inception in 1965.20  However, the Supreme 
Court found the requirement to expand Medicaid to be unconstitutional “economic 
dragooning” under the Spending Clause.21  The Court took no issue with the 
expansion of Medicaid in general, only the portion of the Act that made expansion 
 
 11. See id. at 2580 (discussing the “penalty” liability incurred by noncompliance with the 
Individual Mandate). 
 12. See id. at 2600. 
 13. Id. at 2595, 2600. 
 14. See id. at 2600 (explaining that Congress’s taxing power does not allow for the same kind 
of punitive regulatory force that other sanctions have, nor does it constrain freedom as other 
regulatory penalties do). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (Supp. V 2012) (enabling the Secretary to withhold Medicaid 
payments to noncompliant states). 
 17. See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
 18. See Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures; Federal Matching 
Shares for Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and Aid to Needy Aged, Blind, or 
Disabled Persons for October 1, 2011 through September 30, 2012, 75 Fed. Reg. 69082, 69083 
(Nov. 10, 2010) (showing that every state receives Medicaid assistance). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (Supp. V 2012). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2011). 
 21. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012). 
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a prerequisite for federal Medicaid funding.22  As a result of that decision, the 
Medicaid expansion became a voluntary option for the states, with no penalty for 
the states that have chosen not to participate.23  Because the Act was originally 
designed to be implemented in a much larger healthcare market, the Supreme Court 
decision has had a notable impact on the efficacy of the Act.  
In the 2012 elections, President Obama won re-election and Senate democrats 
strengthened their majority in the U.S. Senate.24  Consequently, many experts 
believed the Act was here to stay;25 however, questions remain regarding its 
implementation.  Although the Supreme Court essentially ended two years of 
uncertainty on the legal status of the Act, it is now unclear whether the original 
goals of the Act and the individual mandate—adding millions of new consumers to 
the health insurance market and increasing the number and share of Americans who 
are insured26—can still be met.  This article explores the Court’s taxing power 
decision with respect to the individual mandate and the direct implications of that 
decision to not only the Act’s objectives for greater individual health insurance 
coverage, but also the possible impact in other health care areas.  Two years after 
the Court’s decision, the Act’s overall implementation is still uncertain.  As states 
work to implement the Act or choose to maintain their own healthcare models, the 
healthcare market is in a state of flux.  Due partially to the Court’s decision to 
restrict the Medicaid expansion, the Act’s effectiveness is now more questionable 
than ever.  Questions addressed by this Article include whether there really still is a 
legal individual mandate requiring the purchase of health insurance27  and whether 
further legislation could be possible under Congress’s taxing power if the goals 
under the Act are not met.28  This article also reviews the question of whether there 
 
 22. Id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the 
Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that states accepting 
such funds comply with the conditions on their use.  What Congress is not free to do is to penalize 
States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away existing Medicaid 
funding.”). 
 23. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION ON THE 
ACA’S MEDICAID EXPANSION 10 (August 2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8347.pdf (explaining that the Court’s 
holding gives states discretion on whether to expand Medicaid). 
 24. See, e.g., 2012 Presidential Election Results, WASH. POST, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/election-map-2012/president/ (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2014); Ted Barrett & Catherine E. Shoichet, Democrats Keep Control of Senate, CNN 
POLITICS (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:12 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/06/politics/senate-preview/. 
 25. See, e.g., Emily Jane Fox, Obama’s Re-election Secures Health Care Reform, CNN 
MONEY (Nov. 7, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/pf/health-care-reform-
obama/ (stating that Obama’s re-election would “neutralize” challenges to the Affordable Care 
Act). 
 26. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (codifying the Individual Mandate, a manifestation of the 
overall goal of increasing the number of covered individuals);  see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 
(Supp. V 2012) (enacting specific provisions to save Americans money on health insurance). 
 27. See infra Part IV.A. 
 28. See infra Part IV.D. 
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has been an expansion of Congress’s taxing power,29 along with an analysis of 
current efforts at implementation and consideration of whether the Court’s decision 
may ultimately have done more harm than good to the individual mandate.30   
II. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
The Act consists of a number of key provisions.  First, there is the individual 
mandate requiring individuals to maintain minimum essential coverage or pay a 
shared responsibility payment (the Individual Mandate).31  Certain classes of 
individuals are exempt from either the Individual Mandate or the tax penalty for 
non-compliance.32  Second, there is the expansion of Medicaid, which provides 
federal funding for states wishing to expand their Medicaid programs to include all 
adults earning 133% of the FPL or less (the Medicaid Expansion).33  Third, there is 
the employer mandate, which imposes penalties on employers for failing to provide 
affordable healthcare to employees (the Employer Mandate).34  The Employer 
Mandate, or more commonly referred to as the “play or pay” rules,35 has been 
delayed and the penalty provisions will not become effective now until 2015.36 
A. Overview of the Act’s Insurance Provisions 
Under the Act, the federal and state governments, insurance companies, 
employers, and individuals “are given shared responsibility to reform and improve 
the availability, quality, and affordability of health insurance coverage in the 
United States.”37  The primary goal of the Act is to increase the number of 
individuals in the United States having health insurance.38  The provisions of the 
 
 29. See infra Part V.A. 
 30. See infra Parts IV.B–C. 
 31. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (codifying the Individual Mandate). 
 32. See id. §§ 5000A(d)–(e) (exempting from the Individual Mandate, for example, 
incarcerated individuals, and from the penalty, individuals under the poverty line). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 1396A(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. V 2012). 
 34. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012) (codifying the Employer Mandate). 
 35. See Cancelosi, supra note 4, at 578 (discussing the details of the Act and ramifications for 
employers). 
 36. Mark J. Mazur, Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, Thoughtful Manner, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (July 2, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Continuing-
to-Implement-the-ACA-in-a-Careful-Thoughtful-Manner-.aspx (discussing the delay of the 
Employer Mandate). 
 37. IRS Q&A on the Individual Shared Responsibility Provision, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
(June 26, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Questions-and-Answers-on-the-Individual-Shared-
Responsibility-Provision  [hereinafter IRS Q&A].   
 38. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. V 2012) (requiring all applicable individuals to maintain 
minimum essential coverage each month, starting January 1, 2014); see also Dinsmore & Shohl 
LLP, Breaking Down the Affordable Care Act, THE NAT’L LAW REV. (June 11, 2010), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/breaking-down-affordable-care-act (discussing the ACA’s 
fundamental goals of improving the quality of health care and making health care more affordable 
and accessible). 
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Act that address health insurance coverage do so through a combination of 
incentives and penalties.  Specifically, they (i) establish a legal mandate that most 
individuals in the United States obtain health insurance for themselves and their 
dependents or pay a financial penalty,39 (ii) establish health insurance exchanges 
throughout the country in which individuals can, with subsidies, purchase health 
insurance,40 (iii) expand Medicaid eligibility to certain nonelderly legal residents,41 
and (iv) place a penalty on certain employers who do not provide minimum health 
benefits to their employees.42   
Starting in 2014, individuals and their families with family income at or 
below 133% (effectively 138%)43 of the FPL will be eligible for Medicaid coverage 
if their state expands Medicaid eligibility.44  In addition, premium assistance tax 
credits will be offered to low and middle income individuals and their families to 
purchase health insurance.45  Individuals will be able to purchase health insurance 
from new health insurance exchanges at prices that reflect “community-rated, 
 
 39. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (describing the requirement of maintaining minimum essential 
coverage for all individuals and dependents of the individual, starting after 2013); id. § 
5000A(b)(1) (imposing a penalty on any individual or dependent of the individual who does not 
maintain minimum essential coverage for one or more months). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012) (requiring each State to establish an American 
Health Benefit Exchange prior to January 1, 2014); id. §18031(d)(2)(A) (requiring that the 
exchanges make available for purchase qualified health plans for individuals); id. §18031(d)(4)(G) 
(requiring that the exchange calculate the actual cost of coverage to the individual after applying 
any premium tax credits or cost-sharing reductions). 
 41. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(10)(A)(i)(VII) (Supp. V 2012) (expanding Medicaid to all individuals, 
beginning January 1, 2014, who are under the age of sixty-five and whose income does not exceed 
133% of the FPL).  However, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, Medicaid expansion in 
each state is now optional and not required.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2607–08 (2012). 
 42. 26 U.S.C. § 4980(H)(a) (Supp. V 2012) (imposing on a large employer who does not offer 
health coverage an assessable payment if at least one full time employee has purchased a qualified 
health plan and qualifies for premium tax credits or cost-sharing reduction).  This provision is now 
delayed until 2015 following a decision by the Department of Health and Human Services.  See 
JANEMARIE MULVEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43150, DELAY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF 
POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES UNDER ACA 1 (2013). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A)(VIII) (Supp. V 2012).  There is a 5% income disregard, so the 
effective rate is 138% of the FPL.  See BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ AND THOMAS GABE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41137, HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM CREDITS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION 
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 6 (2013) (discussing the state option to expand Medicaid to 
individuals with income up to 133% FPL, with an ACA income disregard of 5% FPL). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. V 2012).  For a family of four in 2014, 138% of 
the FPL would be around $33,000.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AND JCT’S ESTIMATES OF 
THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING 
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 6 (March 2012) (discussing the effects that the ACA 
will have on the prevalence of employer-provided health care). 
 45. See FERNANDEZ AND GABE, supra note 43, at 4 (discussing the applicability of the 
premium tax credit to households with incomes between 100–400% of the FPL). 
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guaranteed-issue” insurance coverage.46  Employed individuals with family income 
between 138% and 400% of the FPL will be eligible for some form of subsidy to 
purchase insurance through these insurance exchanges if their employer does not 
offer coverage.47  Employers with more than fifty employees that do not offer 
health insurance and have at least one employee who receives a subsidy for the 
insurance exchange will be subject to a penalty.48  Certain small employers may be 
eligible for a tax credit that covers a percentage of their contributions to health 
insurance premiums.49  
B. Individual Mandate Requirement 
The Individual Mandate requiring most individuals to maintain minimum 
essential health insurance coverage was one of the key features of the Act.50  Under 
the statute, individuals not exempt and who do not comply with the Individual 
Mandate must make a “shared responsibility payment” to the Government (i.e., 
include an additional payment with their federal income tax return).51  The 
Individual Mandate is incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) as 
new Code Section 5000A, which is included as part of Subtitle D “Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes” of the Code.52  Pursuant to Code Section 5000A, beginning January 
1, 2014, an “applicable individual” must “ensure that the individual, and any 
dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under 
minimum essential coverage.”53  The Individual Mandate applies to individuals, 
regardless of age, including children, and is required to be met each month in the 
calendar year.54  For many Americans, the Individual Mandate will likely have little 
 
 46. See CBO AND JCT’S ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON 
THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 44, 
at 6 (discussing how the ACA, in 2014, will enable individuals and families to purchase health 
insurance on exchanges at prices that do not depend on their health status). 
 47. See id. (stating that employed individuals with income below 138% FPL will be eligible 
for Medicaid, while those with income between 200–400% FPL will be eligible for some amount 
of federal subsidies through the exchanges if they do not receive employer-sponsored health 
insurance). 
 48. Id. at 7. 
 49. Id. (explaining that eligibility for this credit is for small businesses that do not employ 
more than twenty-five workers and earn less than $50,000 indexed to the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) beginning in 2014). 
 50. See Alvin Tran, FAQ: How Will The Individual Mandate Work?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS 
(Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2013/september/03/faq-on-individual-
insurance-mandate-aca.aspx (explaining why the Individual Mandate was established, who it 
applies to, and how to satisfy the mandate). 
 51. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012) (“If . . . an applicable individual . . . fails to 
meet the requirements of subsection (a) for 1 or more months . . . there is hereby imposed on the 
taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures.”). 
 52. Id. § 5000A(a) (requiring every applicable individual to maintain minimum essential 
coverage each month). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See IRS Q&A, supra note 37, at 3. 
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impact on them as most people will either have health insurance from their 
employer or be covered under a Governmental or public program.55  Ultimately, 
about one in ten Americans subject to the Individual Mandate will need to decide 
whether to obtain health insurance coverage or pay the penalty.56 
1.  Minimum Essential Coverage 
The requirement for individuals to maintain “minimum essential coverage” 
means that each individual needs to be covered under one of the following types of 
health insurance coverage:  
(1) Government sponsored programs, such as (i) Medicare Part A, (ii) 
Medicaid, (iii) Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”), (iv) TRICARE, (v) 
a health care program administered by the Veterans Administration, (vi) a health 
care program for Peace Corps volunteers or (vii) a Non-appropriated Fund Health 
Benefits Program of the Department of Defense; 
(2) Eligible employer-sponsored plans (i.e., generally a group health plan or 
group health insurance coverage offered by an employer to the employee, including 
COBRA and retiree coverage); 
(3) Health plan coverage purchased in the individual market; 
(4) Grandfathered health plans; or 
(5) Other health benefits coverage, such as a State health benefits risk pool.57 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was granted authority 
by the Act to designate other types of “minimum essential coverage.”58  HHS has 
already acted upon that authority and recently provided for the following additional 
acceptable coverages: 
(1) Medicare Advantage plans. 
 
 55. See Highlights 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/ 
data/ incpovhlth/2012/highlights.html (last revised Sept. 17, 2013) (stating that 54.9% of 
individuals have employment-based health insurance, and 32.6% of individuals have health 
insurance through a government plan). 
 56. See id. (finding nearly 90% of people are covered by either employment-based health 
insurance or government health insurance). 
 57. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(f). 
 58. Id. § 5000A(f)(1)(E) (“Such other health benefits coverage . . . as the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services . . . recognizes for purposes of this subsection”). 
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(2) Refugee Medical Assistance supported by the Administration for Children 
and Families. 
(3) State high risk pools for plan or policy years that begin on or before Dec. 
31, 2014. 
(4) Self-funded health coverage offered to students by universities for plan or 
policy years that begin on or before Dec. 31, 2014.59 
Minimum essential coverage, however, does not include coverage that 
provides for only limited benefits, such as only vision or dental care, Medicaid 
covering only family planning, workers’ compensation, or disability policies.60 
Many Americans subject to the Individual Mandate will have the required 
coverage through either their employer or through the Medicaid or Medicare 
programs.61  If, however, an individual does not have any of the approved types of 
health coverage and does not qualify for an exemption, he or she will have to either 
make a shared responsibility payment or obtain insurance through a health 
insurance exchange or private company in the market in order to maintain 
minimum essential coverage.62 
2.  Applicable Individuals—Exemptions 
The Individual Mandate for minimum essential coverage only applies to 
“applicable individuals,” which includes most individual Americans (adults and 
children), but excludes several categories of individuals.63  Specifically, the Act 
exempts the following four categories of individuals from the Individual Mandate: 
 (1) An individual holding a “religious conscience exemption” which 
certifies that the individual is a member of a recognized religious sect or division, 
and an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division.64 
 
 59. See 45 C.F.R. §156.602 (2013). 
 60. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(3) (Supp. V 2012) (excluding from satisfying “minimum essential 
coverage” health care plans and benefits that are described in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of 
subsection (c) of section 2791 of the Public Health Service Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
91(c)(2006)). 
 61. See IRS Q&A, supra note 37, at 1–2 (listing health insurance plans that qualify as 
minimum essential coverage, including employer-sponsored coverage, Medicare, and Medicaid). 
 62. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (requiring all applicable individuals to maintain minimum essential 
coverage); id. § 5000A(b)(1) (imposing a penalty if an applicable individual does not maintain 
minimum essential coverage); id. § 5000A(e) (establishing exceptions to the Individual Mandate 
for certain individuals); id. § 5000A(f) (defining what constitutes minimum essential coverage, 
including qualified health plans offered by private insurance companies in or out of the state 
exchanges). 
 63. Id. § 5000A(d) (defining individuals who are not “applicable individuals” and do not have 
to comply with the Individual Mandate). 
 64. Id. § 5000A(d)(2)(A). 
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 (2) Any individual that is a member of a recognized “health care sharing 
ministry.”65 
 (3) Any individual that is (i) not a United States citizen or United States 
national or (ii) an alien not lawfully present in the United States.66 
 (4) Any individual that is incarcerated, other than incarceration pending the 
disposition of charges.67 
3.  Shared Responsibility Payment 
Beginning in 2014, persons subject to the Individual Mandate (i.e., those not 
exempted under the applicable individual definition described above) who do not 
obtain health insurance coverage will have to pay a penalty labeled a “shared 
responsibility payment” to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or demonstrate that 
they are separately exempt from such penalty.68  The shared responsibility payment 
is imposed for each month the individual (or an individual for whom the taxpayer is 
liable such as a dependent) fails to have minimum essential health coverage.69  The 
penalty is included as an additional payment owed with the individual’s federal 
income tax return for the year that the failure occurs.70  For joint return filers, the 
spouse is jointly liable for the other spouse’s penalty obligation.71  For children, the 
person(s) who can claim a child or another individual as a dependent for tax 
purposes is the party responsible for making the shared responsibility payment if 
that child or dependent does not have coverage or qualify for an exemption.72 
The amount of the shared responsibility payment penalty is based on a 
complex formula that is calculated as a percentage of household income with floor 
and ceiling thresholds.73  The floor is based on specified dollar amount and the 
 
 65. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 2012).  A “health care sharing ministry” is 
generally a Section 501(c)(3) organization whose members share a common set of ethical or 
religious beliefs and share medical expenses among members in accordance with those beliefs and 
without regard to residence. Id. 
 66. Id. § 5000A(d)(3) (Supp. V 2012).  Generally, all United States citizens, permanent 
residents and all foreign nationals who are in the United States long enough during a calendar year 
to qualify as resident aliens for tax purposes are subject to the Individual Mandate.  See IRS Q&A, 
supra note 37, at 4. 
 67. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(4). 
 68. Id. § 5000A(b)(1). 
 69. Id. § 5000A(c)(2). 
 70. Id. § 5000A(b)(2). 
 71. Id. § 5000A(b)(3)(B). 
 72. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b)(3)(A) (Supp. V 2012).  Although coverage is required, an 
individual’s spouse and dependent children do not have to be covered under the same policy or 
plan as the individual.  See IRS Q&A, supra note 37, at 4. 
 73. See 26 U.S.C. §5000A(c) (establishing that the penalty imposed on any taxpayer is the 
lesser of the sum of the monthly penalty amounts determined under § 5000A(c)(2) or an amount 
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ceiling is based on the average annual premium the individual would have to pay 
for qualifying private health insurance.74   
Specifically, the amount of the penalty charged to an individual for any tax 
year is equal to the sum of the “monthly penalty amounts” in the tax year.75  Such 
penalty will generally be the greater of either a flat dollar amount or percentage of 
income.76  However, in no case can the penalty be greater than an amount equal to 
the national average premium for a “bronze level” qualified health plan that 
provides coverage for the applicable family size involved and is offered through the 
new health insurance exchanges.77  The average annual health insurance premium 
for bronze level coverage is projected to be around $4,800 per year for a single plan 
and $12,250 for a family plan.78  
The “monthly penalty amount” described above is an amount equal to 1/12 of 
the greater of: 
(1) the “Flat Dollar Amount” - an amount equal to the lesser of (i) the sum 
of the “applicable dollar amounts” ($95 in 2014, $325 in 2015 and $695 in 2016 
and years after (children: $47.50, $162.50 and $347.50 respectively)) for all 
individuals in the family with respect to whom such failure occurred during such 
month, or (ii) 300% of the “applicable dollar amount” for the year,79 or  
(2) the “Percentage of Income” - an amount equal to the percentage (1% in 
2014, 2% in 2015 and 2.5% in 2016 and years after) of the excess of the taxpayer’s 
household income for the tax year over the amount of the Code Section 6012(a)(1) 
income tax filing threshold.80  
 
equal to the national average premium for a bronze level qualified health plan offered through the 
exchanges). 
 74. Id. § 5000A(c)(1). 
 75. Id. § 5000A(c)(1)(A). 
 76. Id. § 5000A(c)(2) (the monthly penalty will be equal to 1/12 the greater of either (A) an 
amount equal to the lesser of the “sum of the applicable dollar amounts for all individuals with 
respect to whom such failure occurred during such month, or  (ii) 300 percent of the applicable 
dollar amount”, or (B) an “amount equal to the following percentage of the excess of the taxable 
year over the amount of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1) with respect to the taxpayer 
for the taxable year: (i) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning in 2014. (ii) 2.0 percent for taxable 
years beginning in 2015. (iii) 2.5 percent for taxable years beginning after 2015”). 
 77. Id. § 5000A(c)(1) (establishing that the amount of the penalty “shall be equal to the lesser 
of (A) the sum of the monthly penalty amounts . . . or (B) an amount equal to the national average 
premium for qualified health plans which have a bronze level coverage”). 
 78. See DAVID NEWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41331, INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND 
RELATED INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER PPACA 7, n.25 (2011) (discussing the cap on 
the penalty for an individual who does not maintain minimum essential coverage). 
 79. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(2)(A) (2011). 
 80. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B). 
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 For example, in 2016, the penalty per adult will be equal to 2.5% of the 
individual’s household income above the filing threshold;81 however, in no case 
less than $695 and no more than the national average yearly premium for health 
insurance at the bronze level.82  In looking at how this would ultimately play out in 
2016 for individuals and those with families, the following examples illustrate the 
impact of the penalty in the 2016 tax year: 
• A single individual with income less than the filing threshold of $10,250 
would be exempt from the penalty since they don’t earn enough income to 
file a return.83 
• A single individual making $35,000 a year as household income would be 
expected to owe a penalty of about $695 for that year if they do not have 
health insurance.84 
• A married couple with two dependents with income between 80% and 
400% of the poverty level and who do not obtain health insurance would 
pay a penalty of about $2,085.85 
• A single individual without health insurance making $100,000 a year would 
likely owe about $2,256.86 
• A large  family without health insurance with income in excess of $500,000 
could owe as much as $12,500 in penalty.87 
4.  Penalty Exemptions 
The Act, in an unusual way, provides for an additional layer of exemptions 
for certain individuals to be exempt from payment of the penalty.  Even though one 
may fall into the “applicable individual” category and be subject to the Individual 
Mandate, the penalty provisions provide a separate list of individuals who, even 
though they fail to obtain minimum essential coverage, do not have to pay the 
 
 81. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B)(iii). 
 82. Id. § 5000A(c)(1)–(3)(A). 
 83. See David Auerbach et al., Will Health Insurance Mandates Increase Coverage? 
Synthesizing Perspectives from the Literature in Health Economics, Tax Compliance, and 
Behavioral Economics 8 (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper 2010-05, 2010), available at  
working_paper_2010-05-health_insurance_mandate.pdf. 
 84. See id. (stating that a single person earning between roughly 90% and 300% of the FPL 
would be subject to a flat $695 penalty).  $35,000 is roughly 300% of the projected 2016 FPL of 
$12,000, and would therefore make an uncovered individual earning this amount subject to a flat 
dollar penalty rate of $695.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING 
UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-19-12-Indiv_Mandate_Penalty.pdf. 
 85. See Auerbach et al., supra note 83, at 8–9. 
 86. See id. at 8 (stating that a single person whose income exceeds 300% of the projected 
2016 FPL, but is less than about $200,000, would be subject to a penalty of 2.5% of his or her 
taxable income).  
 87. Id. at 9. 
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shared responsibility payment.88  Those individuals exempt from the penalty fall 
into a much larger group than the group of individuals exempt from the Individual 
Mandate and include the following: 
 (1) Individuals who cannot afford coverage.  This includes individuals 
whose “required contribution” for health coverage for the month (on an annual 
basis) exceeds 8% of the individual’s household income for the tax year (i.e., those 
who would have to pay more than 8% of their income for health insurance).89  The 
“required contribution” amount for an individual is (i) if eligible to purchase 
coverage through an eligible-employer-sponsored plan, the portion of the annual 
premium which would be paid by the individual for self-coverage, or (ii) if eligible 
only to purchase minimum essential coverage in the individual market, the annual 
premium for the lowest cost bronze plan available in the individual market through 
the state insurance exchange where the individual resides, reduced by the amount 
of the tax credit allowable under Code Section 36B.90 
 (2) Individuals with income below the tax-filing threshold.  This includes 
any individual whose household income for the tax year is less than the minimum 
amount of the Code’s income tax return filing requirement.91  Depending on the 
filing status of the individual, such amount is roughly 80 to 90% of the FPL.92  This 
provision essentially exempts those who have not earned enough income to be 
required to file a federal income tax return.93 
 (3) Members of Indian tribes.94   
 (4) Individuals with short coverage gaps.  This includes any individual that 
was not covered by minimum essential coverage for a continuous period of less 
than three months.95  Only one ninety-day period is allowed in a year.96 
 (5) Individuals designated a hardship.  This includes any individual who is 
determined by HHS to have suffered a hardship with respect to the capability to 
 
 88. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)–(5) (2011). 
 89. Id. § 5000A(e)(1)(A). 
 90. Id. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 91. Id. § 5000A(e)(2) (2011); see 26 U.S.C. §6012(a)(1) (2011) for filing requirements. 
 92. The CBO estimates that these amounts would be about $10,000 for a single filer and 
$19,000 for a married couple in 2016.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE 
INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT 
SUPREME COURT DECISION 3 n.5 (July 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf.  
 93. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(2). 
 94. Id. § 5000A(e)(3) (2011).  See 26 U.S.C. § 45A(c)(6) (2013). 
 95. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(4)(A) (2011). 
 96. Id. § 5000A(e)(4)(B)(iii). 
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obtain health insurance coverage.97  Specifically, a state insurance exchange has 
certified that the individual has suffered a hardship that makes him or her unable to 
obtain coverage.98 
The effect of the Act’s exemptions is that it created two classes of individuals 
that ultimately will not have to pay any penalty: (i) those exempted from the 
“applicable individual” definition and (ii) those exempt from the “shared 
responsibility payment” penalty.99   
5.  IRS Administration and Procedure 
The shared responsibility payment penalty will be generally assessed and 
collected by the IRS in the same manner as any other penalty assessable by the 
IRS.100  However, individuals who fail to timely pay the penalty cannot be subject 
to any criminal prosecution or other penalty by the IRS with respect to such failure 
to pay.101  In addition, the IRS cannot file a notice of lien with respect to any 
property of an individual who fails to pay the penalty or levy on any such 
property.102  One important enforcement tool that the IRS will be able to use is to 
offset any tax refunds owed to a taxpayer by the amount owed to the IRS for the 
shared responsibility payment penalty.103 
Demonstrating any exemption from the minimum essential coverage 
requirement or penalty will be necessary for the effective administration of the 
Individual Mandate.  Individuals claiming a religious conscience exemption or 
certain hardship exemption generally will need to obtain an exemption certificate 
from the insurance exchange.104  Those individuals who are a member of an Indian 
 
 97. Id. § 5000A(e)(5). 
 98. ACA Statutory Exemptions from the Requirement to Obtain Minimum Essential Coverage, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
health/small-business-health-insurance.aspx#Exemptions. 
 99. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2653 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Act exempts three classes of 
people from the “applicable individual” definition and also creates a separate set of exemptions 
excusing liability for certain individuals failing to maintain minimum coverage). 
 100. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(1). 
 101. Id. § 5000A(g)(2)(A). 
 102. Id. § 5000A(g)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (stating the Secretary will not file a “notice of lien with 
respect to any property of a taxpayer by reason of failure to pay the penalty imposed by this 
section or levy any such property with respect to such failure”). 
 103. Howard Gleckman, Obamacare: Tax Or Penalty? Call It What You Want, But IRS Won't 
Be Able To Collect It, FORBES (July 3, 2012, 2:42 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/07/03/some-tax-few-will-face-obamacare-uninsured-
penalty-and-irs-hamstrung-to-collect/ (stating the IRS’s only tool for collecting penalty will be 
subtracting penalty from a refund it owes penalized taxpayers).  
 104. See IRS Q&A, supra note 37, at 1 (stating religious conscience and hardship exemptions 
are only granted by going to Health Insurance Marketplace and applying for an exemption 
certificate).  
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tribe or health care sharing ministry, or are incarcerated may claim exemption on 
their federal income tax return or by obtaining an exemption certificate from the 
insurance exchange.105  Those individuals claiming exemption due to unaffordable 
coverage, a short coverage gap, certain hardships or who are not lawfully present in 
the United States can only claim such exemption on their federal income tax 
return.106  The exemption for those under the filing threshold is available 
automatically and requires no action.107 
The IRS will receive information on enrollees covered under a health plan 
from insurance companies and other payers each year, with similar information 
also sent to those insured.108  The IRS will receive information on those who 
receive a hardship waiver, affordability exemption, or other type of exemption by 
the individual either claiming an exemption on their individual tax return or filing 
an exemption form.109  The IRS will then use this information to identify those 
individuals who have not complied with the Individual Mandate and failed to pay 
the penalty.110   
6.  Transition Relief 
The IRS has provided transition relief from the shared responsibility payment 
penalty for certain individuals who are eligible to enroll in an employer-sponsored 
health plan with a plan year other than a calendar year if the plan year begins in 
2013 and ends in 2014.111  This transition relief for such individuals begins January 
1, 2014, and continues through the month in which the particular non-calendar plan 
year ends.112 
C. The Medicaid Expansion 
There is no deadline for state enrollment in the Medicaid Expansion, however 
there is currently nothing to indicate that states who choose not to enroll in 2014 
 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Final Regulations on Information Reporting of Minimum Essential Coverage, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 13220 (March 10, 2014) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. 6055), available at 
https://federalregister.gov/a/2014-05051.  See Barbara Marquand, How the Feds Will Know if You 
Have Health Insurance, CAPITAL BLUECROSS.COM (Apr. 3, 2013), 
https://www.capbluecross.com/wps/wcm/connect/cbc-public/cbc/healthcarereform/fedsarticle. 
 109. How do I Qualify for an Exemption from the Fee for Not Having Health Coverage?, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/exemptions/ (last visited May 16, 2014).   
 110. See Marquand, supra note 108. 
 111. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN: TRANSITION RELIEF FOR 
EMPLOYEES AND RELATED INDIVIDUALS ELIGIBLE TO ENROLL IN ELIGIBLE EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED HEALTH PLANS FOR NON-CALENDAR PLAN YEARS THAT BEGIN IN 2013 AND END IN 
2014 NOTICE 2013–42, 61 (July 15, 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb13-
29.pdf. 
 112. Id. at 62. 
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will readily change their minds.113  As of August 1, 2013, twenty-seven states had 
decided to participate or are leaning toward participation in the Medicaid 
Expansion.114  Four states are seeking approval to use federal funds to expand 
coverage under current state programs.115  Many of the states that have chosen not 
to participate cite budget concerns.116  Further, many report that insurance 
premiums are actually rising and moving toward unaffordability, and that employer 
subsidies may be less helpful than anticipated.117  Those states participating in the 
Medicaid Expansion and currently implementing preparatory programs report 
successes, but also report expected increases in Medicaid enrollment of 20-
101%.118  Unfortunately, many of the states that have chosen not to participate have 
large populations of poor and uninsured adults.119  Resultantly, when the Act is 
fully realized in 2016, only slightly more than half of the states will currently be 
 
 113. See Emily Whelan Parento & Lawrence O. Gostin, Better Health, But Less Justice: 
Widening Health Disparities After National Federation Of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 27 
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 481, 483 (2013) (noting that “[t]hough states face no 
firm deadline for opting into the expansion, there is no reason to think participation rates will be 
materially higher in future years than in 2014, when funding will be at its most generous level.”). 
 114.  See Where Each State Stands on ACA's Medicaid Expansion: A Roundup of What Each 
State's Leadership Has Said About Their Medicaid Plans, ADVISORY BD. CO. (June 14, 2013), 
http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2012/11/09/MedicaidMap (listing each state that has 
decided to expand Medicaid coverage or is currently leaning towards expanding Medicaid 
coverage). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Where the States Stand on Medicaid Expansion: 26 States, D.C. Expanding Medicaid, 
ADVISORY BD. CO. (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.advisory.com/_apps/ 
dailybriefingprint?i={C14C9308-36AF-401F-8802-334CE6B5D6AF} (stating that six state 
governors have specifically cited budget concerns when addressing their refusal to expand).  
 117. See, e.g., Lara Hoffmans, ACA’s Not-So-Great Rate Shock Debate, FORBES (June 4, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larahoffmans/2013/06/04/acas-not-so-great-rate-shock-debate/ 
(reporting that in states with their own exchanges, such as California and Oregon, plan premiums 
are likely to double); Bruce Rogers, More Surprise from the Affordable Care Act, FORBES (May 
31, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucerogers/2013/05/31/more-surprises-from-the-
affordable-care-act/ (discussing design limitations of employer subsidies within the ACA such as 
“no employer subsidies are required for the worker’s children or spouse” and that certain tax 
credits are available “only if neither spouse is offered and employer-subsidized policy”). 
 118. TERESA A. COUGHLIN ET AL., THE URBAN INST., ARE STATE MEDICAID MANAGED 
CARE PROGRAMS READY FOR 2014? A REVIEW OF EIGHT STATES, tbl.2 (May 2013), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412826-Are-State-Medicaid-Managed-Care-Programs-
Ready-for-2014.pdf. 
 119. See Parento & Gostin, supra note 113, at 504 (“Among states that have decided against 
participating in the expansion, many have rates of uninsured considerably higher than the national 
average . . . . ”); see also KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE COVERAGE GAP: UNINSURED POOR 
ADULTS IN STATES THAT DO NOT EXPAND MEDICAID (Oct. 23, 2013), http://kff.org/health-
reform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-
medicaid/ (reporting that in states that are not participating in expansion, nearly five million poor 
and uninsured adults that will fall into coverage gaps between Medicaid and Marketplace 
premium tax credits, making it very difficult for the poor and uninsured to obtain coverage). 
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participating, and the costs of national insurance will be dispersed over a much 
smaller population.120   
D. Employer Mandate: The “Play or Pay” Requirement 
The Act requires large employers of fifty or more full-time equivalent 
employees provide affordable healthcare coverage to full-time employees.121  This 
requirement was intended to become effective in 2014, and provided for federal 
assistance in order to verify that employers were offering appropriate healthcare as 
part of the subsidy eligibility verification for state-based insurance exchanges.122  
However, due to delays in the availability of federal assistance to ensure employer 
compliance, the requirement for employers to provide healthcare will not become 
effective until 2015.123  Because employers will not be required by law to provide 
affordable healthcare options to employees at the Act’s outset, many have 
speculated that the number of uninsured may rise as a result.124   
Others, however, speculate the delay may stimulate enrollment in the health 
exchanges.  According to one report, the success of the Act is:  
largely dependent on how many people are willing to buy health plans 
through the government exchanges.  Most of the people affected by 
Obama’s decision to delay the employer mandate to provide health 
care will now be eligible to use the exchange . . . .  An increase in 
enrollment, particularly by young people such as restaurant workers, 
will help the exchanges by making their pool of customers less risky 
to cover.  That could lead to lower premiums starting in 2015, said Jay 
Angoff, a Mehri & Skalet law partner who had been director of 
 
 120. See Editorial Board, Millions Will Remain Uninsured Because of Blocked Medicaid 
Expansion in States, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/millions-will-remain-uninsured-because-of-blocked-
medicaid-expansion-in-states/2013/11/15/9629bcfa-4b1c-11e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4_story.html 
(reporting that Medicaid expansion has been blocked in half the states). 
 121. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)-(c)(2)(A) (2011). 
 122. Mark J. Mazur, Treasury Notes: Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, 
Thoughtful Manner, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (July 2, 2013), 
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/pages/continuing-to-implement-the-aca-in-a-careful-
thoughtful-manner-.aspx (stating the Obama administration will delay the start of the employer 
and insurer reporting mandates).  
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes & Robert Pear, Crucial Rule Is Delayed a Year for Obama’s 
Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/us/politics/obama-
administration-to-delay-health-law-requirement-until-2015.html?ref=politics (quoting George 
Washington Law Professor Sara Rosenbaum, “This step could significantly reduce the number of 
uninsured people who will gain coverage in 2014.”). 
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insurance oversight at the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services under Obama.125 
However, many experts remain worried.126  The success of the Act largely depends 
on whether young and healthy individuals will relinquish part of their disposable 
income to pay for insurance.  HHS figures shows nationwide there are 11.6 million 
people between ages eighteen and thirty-four who are uninsured.127  Many young 
people may see insurance as a luxury, and they may be content not having it.128  A 
failure to convince them otherwise will drive up the rates for others.129   
Despite such predictions, a recent study by the Urban Institute, using a 
methodology comparable to that of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), has 
found that the delay in implementation of the Employer Mandate is likely to have 
negligible results on the number of uninsured, non-elderly individuals.130  
According to the study, the number of Americans uninsured under the Act without 
the Employer Mandate is predicted to be 28,264,000 individuals or 10.2% of the 
population, which is only 0.1% more than the 10.1% of the population (27,928,000 
people) predicted to remain uninsured under the Act with the Employer Mandate 
fully intact.131  Instead, the data seems to indicate that the real heart of the Act is 
the Individual Mandate, which, if eliminated from the Act would leave a startling 
41,969,000 Americans uninsured, or 15.1% of the population.132  It is possible that 
the Employer Mandate is somewhat inconsequential in shaping employer policy, 
 
 125. Alex Wayne, Obama’s Employer Health Care Delay May Goose Exchange Enrollment, 
BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-15/obama-s-employer-
health-care-delay-may-goose-exchange-enrollment.html. 
 126. See Maggie Fox, Delay in Health Insurance Law Won’t Affect Many, Experts Say, NBC 
NEWS (July 3, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/delay-health-insurance-law-
wont-affect-many-experts-say-6C10527171 (discussing the opposing views between experts on 
the effect of the employer health insurance delay). 
 127. Christopher Weaver & Louise Radnofsky, New Health-Care Law’s Success Rests on the 
Young, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324263404578613700273320428. 
 128. See Kelli Kennedy, Health Insurers Fear Young People Will Opt Out, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(July 5, 2103), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/health-insurers-fear-young-people-will-opt-out 
(discussing the concerns of many young Americans who do not see health insurance as a 
necessity). 
 129. See Lewis Krauskopf, Obamacare May Get Sick if Young Americans Don’t Sign Up, 
REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/12/us-usa-healthcare-
enrollment-idUSBREA0B07Y20140112 (discussing the need for young healthy adults to sign up 
for health insurance in order to offset the costs of the elderly). 
 130. See Linda Blumberg et al., It’s No Contest: The ACA’s Employer Mandate Has Far Less 
Effect on Coverage and Costs Than the Individual Mandate, URBAN INSTITUTE 1, 3 (July 2013), 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412865-ACA-Employer-Mandate.pdf. 
 131. Id. at 2 tbl.1, 3. 
 132. See id. at 3. 
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which is instead shaped by the demands of high-quality employees.133  That 
demand is in turn motivated by the Individual Mandate, which, although it seems to 
be the most effective means of promoting healthcare consumption, is still not 
completely effective. 
E. Health Insurance Exchanges 
One significant feature of the Act is the creation of health insurance 
exchanges in every state. These insurance exchanges referred to as “Health 
Insurance Marketplaces”134 or “Affordable Insurance Exchanges”135 opened for 
enrollment in October of 2013.136  The goal of these insurance exchanges is to 
assist individuals in obtaining minimum essential coverage and potentially provide 
financial assistance to cover the cost of such insurance.137  In addition, a function of 
the insurance exchanges will be to grant exemption certificates to those individuals 
who qualify.138  
F. Projections on the Individual Mandate and Penalty 
The CBO originally estimated that, even with the Act in place, about thirty 
million individuals in America would be uninsured in 2016.139  The CBO estimated 
this group would be mostly composed of (i) individuals who are unauthorized 
immigrants, (ii) individuals who will be eligible for Medicaid but fail to enroll, (iii) 
individuals who will be eligible for subsidies, but do not utilize them, (iv) 
individuals exempt from the Individual Mandate and (v) individuals who will be 
 
 133. See id. at 4 (discussing the relative unchanged premium spending by employers when the 
Employer Mandate is dropped); see also Decision to Delay Employer Mandate Will Cause More 
Employers to Drop Coverage, PRWEB (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.prweb.com/releases/health-
insurance-exchange/private-exchange/prweb10899757.htm (statement of Josh Hilgers) 
(“[E]mployers offer benefits for a variety of reasons . . . but the number one reason is to attract 
and retain employees.”). 
 134. What is the Health Insurance Marketplace?, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-is-the-health-insurance-marketplace/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
 135. Creating a New Competitive Health Insurance Marketplace, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Marketplace-Grants/ (last visited Feb. 
18, 2014). 
 136. State Health Insurance Marketplaces, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/state-marketplaces.html (last 
updated Oct. 1, 2013). 
 137. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 138. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange Functions; Eligibility for 
Exemptions; Miscellaneous Minimum Essential Coverage Provisions, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,494, 
39,524 (July 1, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155 and 156). 
 139. PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 
supra note 84, at 1. 
	   	  
238 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 17 
subject to the Individual Mandate, but do not comply.140  The number of people 
estimated to fall within the Individual Mandate’s exemption for unauthorized 
immigrants and the penalty exemption for members of Indian tribes, low income 
individuals, and unaffordable coverage individuals was estimated to be around 
eighteen to nineteen million individuals.141  According to those figures, a majority 
of the thirty million uninsured individuals would not have been subject to the 
Individual Mandate or the shared responsibility payment penalty.142   
When the Act was passed in 2010, the CBO had originally projected that, of 
the number of people ultimately subject to the Individual Mandate and penalty 
provision, approximately 3.9 million individuals would pay the shared 
responsibility penalty rather than purchase the required amount of health 
insurance.143  After the Court’s decision, the CBO increased that number to 5.9 
million people who will pay a penalty rather than obtain health insurance.144  About 
85% of that increase is a result of changes to the CBO’s baseline projections, 
including the effects of new legislation and economic outlook changes.145  The 
remaining 15% of the increase is a direct result of the increase in the number of 
uninsured people expected to pay the penalty based on the Court’s decision on the 
Medicaid Expansion.146 
Estimates were also provided by the CBO in terms of the monetary effect of 
the shared responsibility payment penalty that individuals would have to pay.147  
The shared responsibility payment penalty will generate revenue in the billions per 
year.148  Specifically, the CBO now estimates that penalty payments by uninsured 
individuals will produce $2 billion in revenue in 2015, $4 billion per year in 2016 
through 2018, and $5 billion per year in 2019-2022.149  By 2022, $32 billion in total 
 
 140. See id. at 1–2 (discussing those who will not be insured by 2016); see also CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S MAY 2013 ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 tbl.1 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/ 
files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2013-05-ACA.pdf (estimating the number of uninsured 
nonelderly people under the ACA). 
 141. PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 
supra note 84, at 1. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 2 tbl.1. 
 145. Id. at 1. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. at 2 tbl.1 (displaying the estimated distribution of Individual Mandate penalties 
under the ACA). 
 148. See id. (showing that the CBO is predicating $6.9 billion total penalty payments in the 
year 2016). 
 149. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT 2 tb.1 (2014), at 2 tb.1 available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
attachments/43900-2014-04-ACAtables2.pdf. [hereinafter INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT] 
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revenue is now expected to accrue from the shared responsibility payment 
penalty.150 
Unfortunately, new studies and predictions indicate that the number of 
Americans likely to remain without or lose health insurance once the health 
insurance exchanges go into effect has increased.151  Of those in states that have 
chosen not to implement the Medicaid Expansion, approximately 90% of the 
uninsured are predicted to be below 138% of the FPL.152  In states that will have 
adopted the Medicaid Expansion, 40% of Medicaid-eligible residents are predicted 
to remain uninsured in 2016.153  Furthermore, federal revenue is likely to decrease 
due to the delay of the Employer Mandate.154  The Government is anticipated to 
lose approximately $3.7 billion in employer penalties during the extra year it will 
take to implement the Employer Mandate.155  This is the most dramatic effect of the 
delay, which is otherwise predicted to have negligible results. 
After full implementation of the Act, a significant number of people will now 
likely remain uninsured.156  The five states that are expected to have the highest 
uninsurance rates are: Texas (where 191.3 in every 1,000 residents will not have 
insurance); Louisiana (167.8 in every 1,000 residents); Georgia (155.3 in every 
1,000 residents); South Carolina (152.6 in every 1,000 residents); and Alaska 
(142.2 in every 1,000 residents).157  None of these states has elected to participate 
in the Medicaid Expansion.158  Some states, however, are expected to have higher 
rates of success.  The lowest uninsurance rates are expected to occur in states 
adopting the Medicaid Expansion, namely, Massachusetts (where just 16.9 in every 
1,000 residents will not have insurance); Hawaii (38.1 in every 1,000 residents); 
District of Columba (42.7 in every 1,000 residents); Connecticut (45.1 in every 
1,000 residents); and North Dakota (45.7 in every 1,000 residents).159  Some results 
are mixed; Nevada is expected to see a 50.25% reduction in its uninsured 
 
 150. See id. (adding the total number of estimated penalties paid by 2022 is projected to be $55 
billion).  
 151. See Rachel Nardin et al., The Uninsured After Implementation of the Affordable Care Act: 
A Demographic And Geographic Analysis, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 6, 2013), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/06/06/the-uninsured-after-implementation-of-the-affordable-
care-act-a-demographic-and-geographic-analysis/ (estimating that the Supreme Court’s decision to 
allow states to opt-out of Medicaid expansion could increase the number of uninsured Americans 
by 1.2 million). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. See Blumberg et al., supra note 130, at 4. 
 155. Id.  
 156. See PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT, supra note 84, at 1. 
 157. Juliette Mullin, et al., Which States Will Have the Most Uninsured Residents in 2016?, 
ADVISORY BD. CO. (June 18, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/blog/2013/06/which-
states-will-have-the-most-uninsured-residents-in-2016. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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population after it implements the Medicaid Expansion, although 109.5 in every 
1,000 residents are still expected to remain uninsured.160 
Since the issuance of the one-year delay of the Employer Mandate, there is 
also now a call to delay the Individual Mandate.161  Various bills in Congress have 
been prepared to implement such a delay, although the success of such legislation 
may be unlikely.162  Many, including the Obama Administration, have indicated 
that the impact of a delay of the Individual Mandate will cause an increase in health 
insurance premium rates and increase the number of uninsured and undermine the 
key elements of the Act.163 
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The Act came before the Supreme Court in 2012.164  The Supreme Court 
considered the issue in several contexts, including the Anti-Injunction Act and the 
Congressional Taxing Authority before deciding the issue under the Taxing and 
Spending Power.165  There was strong opposition to the decision by a four-Justice 
dissent.166 
A. The Decision: Overview 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was argued before 
the Supreme Court in March of 2012 and decided in June of 2012.167  Although the 
Act itself is over nine hundred pages, only two provisions were challenged before 
the Court: the Individual Mandate and the Medicaid Expansion.168  At issue here is 
the Individual Mandate, which was challenged in four different circuits.169  The 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Emily Lee, Costs of Delaying the Individual Mandate, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 
30, 2013), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2013/10/30/78415/the-costs-
of-delaying-the-individual-mandate/ (stating that members of Congress are seeking to delay the 
Individual Mandate). 
 162. See John Parkinson, House Votes to Delay Employer and Individual Mandates by One 
Year, ABC NEWS (Jul. 17, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/house-votes-to-
delay-employer-and-individual-mandates-by-one-year/ (discussing the numerous unsuccessful 
attempts to delay or repeal the Individual Mandate). 
 163. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2667 & H.R. 2668 (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saphr2667r_20130716.pdf 
(stating that the House’s attempts at delaying the ACA would increase the costs of health 
insurance and the number of uninsured Americans). 
 164. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). 
 165. See id. at 2582, 2601. 
 166. See id. at 2677 (stating in a dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito that they would hold “the Act invalid in its entirety”) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 167. See id. at 2566. 
 168. See id. at 2580. 
 169. See id. at 2580–81 (stating that the Eleventh, Sixth, D.C., and Fourth Circuits heard 
challenges to the Individual Mandate). 
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Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit upheld the Individual Mandate, and the Fourth 
Circuit held that the Anti-Injunction Act barred review at this point.170  The 
decision on review before the Court here was a decision by the Eleventh Circuit 
declaring (i) the Individual Mandate in excess of Congressional authority and (ii) 
the Medicaid Expansion as an acceptable exercise.171  The appellate decision stood 
in contrast to the Florida district court decision in favor of the plaintiffs, including 
twenty-five states, which struck down the Act in its entirety.172 
The Supreme Court was sharply divided on the case.173  Chief Justice Roberts 
authored the Majority Opinion, which held that the Individual Mandate was 
allowed as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power, but it was won by a slim 
margin.174  Justice Roberts also authored individual opinions addressing the 
Individual Mandate in other contexts, such as the Commerce Clause.175  Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined in the Chief Justice’s opinion with 
respect to the Facts, the non-applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act, and the 
Individual Mandate as construed under the Taxing and Spending Clause.176  Justice 
Ginsburg wrote a separate opinion arguing to uphold the Act in its entirety under 
every aspect of Congressional authority, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in 
which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in part.177  Justice Scalia wrote for the 
dissent, in which Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined, arguing that the Act 
should be struck down in its entirety.178  Justice Thomas also wrote a solitary 
dissent.179 
B. The Anti-Injunction Act 
Before proceeding to the merits, the majority first dismissed the Anti-
Injunction Act as inapplicable.180  The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits judicial review 
or impediment of any effort to collect a tax, and Amicus argued that this barred 
 
 170. See id. at 2581 (explaining that the “Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit upheld the mandate 
as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power,” and the “Fourth Circuit determined that the 
Anti–Injunction Act prevents courts from considering the merits”). 
 171. Id. at 2582. 
 172. Id. at 2580. 
 173. See id. at 2609, 2677 (explaining that Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan 
agree with Chief Justice Roberts’ conclusions regarding the Anti–Injunction Act and that the 
minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power, while Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissent calling “the Act invalid in its entirety”). 
 174. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). 
 175. See id. at 2583–84. 
 176. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
 177. See id. 
 178. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 179. Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. at 2584 (majority opinion). 
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review of the Individual Mandate.181  However, the Court disagreed, holding that 
the Individual Mandate was in fact a penalty rather than a tax due mostly to the 
classification afforded it by Congress.182  Congress in this case explicitly failed to 
categorize or label the penalty as a tax, despite having evidenced a willingness to 
do so elsewhere in the Act.183  Because the Anti-Injunction Act is a creation of 
Congress, the Court deferred to Congress’s discretion to dictate what does and does 
not fall under its scope.184  The majority interpreted the legislative intent inherent in 
the language of the Act to communicate a relatively clear desire to consider the 
Individual Mandate as a penalty, and thus not subject to the strictures of the Anti-
Injunction Act.185 
C. Congressional Taxing Authority 
Congress has the power under Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution to lay and 
collect Taxes and Duties.186  This is a broad authority, and the Court has 
historically refused to significantly limit that authority except in the case of taxes 
that are in fact punitive measures.187  There are only two forms of tax: direct taxes 
and indirect taxes.188  Direct taxes are the subject of the Direct Tax Clause of the 
Constitution, providing that such taxes must be collected in proportion to the 
Census.189  Taxes taken under this authority must be apportioned amongst the states 
in relation to their populations rather than assessed individually.190  Direct taxes 
have historically been very difficult to define, and have been limited by a number 
of key precedents.191  Examples would include capitations and real property taxes 
among others.192  Indirect taxes, on the other hand, are practically unlimited in their 
scope, and seem to include practically every other type of tax not explicitly 
considered direct by precedent.193 
 
 181. See id. at 2582. 
 182. See id. at 2583–84.  
 183. See id. at 2583. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 187. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 188. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (proclaiming that “Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes,” which are direct taxes, and “Duties, Imposts and Excises,” which are indirect 
taxes). 
 189. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless 
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”). 
 190. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 191. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012) (discussing the 
history of the Court’s interpretation of the Direct Tax Clause). 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. at 2596 (citing a variety of taxes classified as “regulatory”). 
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National Federation cites several relevant precedents.194  First, the Court 
notes that in 1881 a poll tax was determined to be a direct tax.195  In 1796 it was 
determined that a tax on carriages was not.196  Taxes on personal property and 
income from such were once considered direct taxes, as well as taxes on real 
estate.197  However, the Sixteenth Amendment later disagreed with respect to 
personal property.198  These limited categories have so far prescribed the only 
categories in which Congress may impose a direct tax proportionate to the 
population of each state.199   
Here, the majority made the determination that the Individual Mandate was in 
no way a direct tax, and therefore fell under the broad category of an indirect tax if 
it were indeed a tax at all.200  As an indirect tax, the Individual Mandate fell under 
the Taxing Authority of Congress without further Constitutional limitation.201  The 
Taxing Authority, as opposed to the Commerce Authority, proved key to the 
survival of the Act due precisely to its breadth and scope.202  In the Court’s 
decision, both the broad nature of the Taxing Authority and the restriction in scope 
to monetary duties and penalties were key arguments in favor of the Individual 
Mandate.203 
D. The Individual Mandate 
Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion discussing the Individual 
Mandate under Congressional Taxing and Spending Power.204  He first articulated 
several reasons as to why the Individual Mandate may be construed as a tax,205 and 
then proceeded to explain why this was an acceptable use of Congressional 
authority.206  In defining the Individual Mandate as a tax, the majority notes that it 
has the qualities of a tax: it is paid to the IRS, along with annual taxes, and thereby 
produces Government revenue.207  The Court distinguished the tax from an 
effective punishment or penalty based on precedent: it noted that the shared 
 
 194. See id. at 2598. 
 195. Id. at 2598 (citing Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 596–98 (1881)). 
 196. Id. at 2598 (citing Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171, 174 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.)). 
 197. Id. (citing Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895)). 
 198. Id. (citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–219 (1920)). 
 199. See id. (stating that Article I, § 9, clause 4 of the Constitution “means that any ‘direct Tax’ 
must be apportioned so that each State pays in proportion to its population”). 
 200. See id. at 2599. 
 201. See id. at 2600. 
 202. See id. (stating that “the breadth of Congress's power to tax is greater than its power to 
regulate commerce,” and “[b]ecause the Constitution permits such a tax,” it is not [the Court’s] 
role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 2577. 
 205. Id. at 2594–97. 
 206. Id. at 2597–600. 
 207. See id. at 2594. 
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responsibility payment was a tenable, perhaps more cost-effective alternative to 
purchasing insurance; that there was no scienter requirement (requiring a knowing 
violation of the law); and that it was collected as a normal tax by the IRS.208  
Finally, the opinion indicated that taxes that influence behavior are acceptable, so 
long as they are not punishments for certain acts.209  Here, there are no negative 
legal consequences for failing to maintain health insurance, and payment fulfills all 
of an individual’s obligations under the law.210   
The Court was not swayed by the fact that Congress did not directly label the 
payment as a tax, arguing that the payment was defined by its nature rather than by 
labels.211  Further, the Court held that any determinations made for the purposes of 
the Anti-Injunction Act were, conversely, based solely on Congressional labels 
rather than nature, and thus were inapplicable here.212  This neatly dismissed the 
contradiction of labeling the Individual Mandate as other than a tax for purposes of 
the Anti-Injunction Act.213  Finally, the Court determined that the tax was 
acceptable Constitutionally as an indirect tax.214 
The Court attempted to assuage any doubts similar to those raised in regard to 
the Commerce Clause discussion.  First, it noted that the Constitution does not 
guarantee that inactivity will result in a lack of taxation.215  Second, it was held that 
this particular usage was not overwhelmingly punitive and that the payment may be 
defined under the narrowest definition of an acceptable tax.216  Third, the majority 
stated that Congressional taxing power was more limited than its regulatory power, 
as the power to tax was only a power to collect funds, not a power to compel or 
punish beyond forced payment.217  For these reasons, the Court held that the 
Individual Mandate was Constitutionally acceptable, and that therefore the Court 
had no authority to “pass on its wisdom or fairness.”218 
E.  The Medicaid Expansion 
The Chief Justice also authored an opinion regarding the Medicaid 
Expansion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.219  Justice Ginsburg also 
 
 208. Id. at 2595–96. 
 209. See id. at 2596. 
 210. Id. at 2596–97. 
 211. See id. at 2598. 
 212. See id. at 2594. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. at 2600. 
 215. Id. at 2599. 
 216. See id. at 2599–600. 
 217. Id. at 2600. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. at 2601–09 (opining that the Medicaid expansion violates the Constitution because 
it threatens states to accept the expansion program or lose funds for their existing Medicaid 
program). 
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filed an opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurring in that judgment but 
concurring and dissenting in part.220  The Chief Justice’s opinion scrutinized the 
Medicaid Expansion as a product of the Congressional spending authority under the 
Spending Clause.221  He noted that the Court has previously recognized limits on 
that authority, which he cited as being similar to a contractual authority.222  
Referencing the merits of federalism and state sovereignty, the Chief Justice 
stressed the need for knowing voluntariness when states contract with the federal 
government for funding provided by Spending Clause legislation.223  He 
emphasized that undue influence in such legislation undermines state sovereignty 
and the federal system of government.224  He found the Act to be an unduly 
coercive “gun to the head” of states, which intruded on state autonomy by 
threatening the loss of substantial portions of state budgets if they failed to comply 
with legislation that Congress could not enact directly under its enumerated 
powers.225   
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Medicaid Expansion in its entirety was 
within Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause.226  She noted that Medicaid 
has been expanded a number of times over the years, and thus that the recent 
expansion was not, as the Chief Justice argued, unforeseeable.227  She also found it 
relevant that Congress was not required to provide funding under its spending 
power, and that it was empowered to do so in pursuit of the general welfare as it 
sees fit.228  A majority of the Court felt that states’ reliance on Medicaid prohibited 
Congress from altering the nature of the legislation too drastically based on a 
contract theory.229  Justice Ginsburg, however, felt that states had no right to 
anticipated funds, and that Congress had an unadulterated right to alter the 
preconditions for receipt of those funds at any point through legal legislation.230  
Although she disagreed with the Chief Justice’s opinion as to the Medicaid 
Expansion’s undue influence, Justice Ginsburg joined in his judgment because he 
voted only to strike down the mandatory aspect of the Medicaid Expansion rather 
than the whole Act.231 
 
 220. See id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
 221. See id. at 2601–09 (majority opinion). 
 222. See id. at 2602. 
 223. See id.  
 224. See id. 
 225. Id. at 2604. 
 226. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
 227. See id. at 2630. 
 228. See id. at 2633, 2641. 
 229. See id. at 2641. 
 230. See id. at 2633, 2641. 
 231. See id. at 2641–42. 
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F.  The Dissent 
Justice Scalia and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined in a joint 
dissent.232  The dissent argued that the Individual Mandate (i) exceeded 
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause,233 (ii) was a penalty rather 
than a tax and thus that consideration under the taxing power was irrelevant,234 and 
(iii) that the same arguments permitted review under the Anti-Injunction Act.235  
The dissenters further concluded that the Medicaid Expansion was impermissibly 
coercive under the Spending Power,236 that these components were so critical to the 
Act as a whole that they could not be severed,237 and that the Act itself must be 
deemed unconstitutional on the whole.238  Finally, they noted that the majority’s 
construction of the Act so as to be constitutionally permissible exceeded the 
boundaries of judicial authority.239 
In regard to the taxing power, the joint dissenters believed that interpretation 
under this authority was improper because the language of the Individual Mandate 
clearly indicated that it was a mandate rather than a tax.240  They relied on 
precedent to determine that it was a mandate with an associated collectible penalty 
rather than a tax, as well as the wording of the statute (“the individual shall 
ensure”).241  They further noted that the statute differentiated between those exempt 
from the penalty and those exempt from the Individual Mandate itself.242  They felt 
it was error to construe what Congress actually did do, create a mandate with an 
associated penalty, as something that it might have permissibly done—create a 
healthcare tax.243  They also indicated that penalties are not associated with things 
that are lawful or correct, that is, by penalizing an act through statute the act is 
made unlawful.244  As such, the dissenters concluded that the Individual Mandate 
 
 232. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 233. See id. at 2648–50. 
 234. See id. at 2651–55. 
 235. Id. at 2656. 
 236. Id. at 2666. 
 237. See id. at 2671–75 (arguing that the Individual Mandate and Medicaid expansion are not 
severable from the Act’s major provisions, which include insurance regulations and taxes, 
reductions in reimbursements to hospitals and other reductions in Medicare expenditures, health 
insurance exchanges and their federal subsidies, and the employer-responsibility assessment). 
 238. Id. at 2677. 
 239. See id. at 2676 (describing the Court’s interpretation of the Act as “judicial 
overreaching.”). 
 240. See id. at 2655 (“[T]o say that the Individual Mandate merely imposes a tax is not to 
interpret the statute but to rewrite it.”). 
 241. See id. at 2652–53 (citing Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox R. Co.).  26 U.S.C. § 
5000A(a) (Supp. V 2012). 
 242. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2653. 
 243. Id. at 2651, 2655. 
 244. See id. at 2652  (citing Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox R. Co., 65 S. Ct. 247, 252 
(1861)). 
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was necessarily not a tax, and therefore could not fall under the taxing power.245  
Although they noted the Court’s obligation to construe statute as constitutional 
when possible, they drew the line on such construction at what seemed to him to be 
blatant reinterpretation.246 
Finally, the dissent briefly indicated that for the same reasons the Individual 
Mandate was not a tax for purposes of the taxing power, namely plain language and 
precedential tax-penalty distinctions, it was not a tax for purposes of the Anti-
Injunction Act.247  They indicated that the majority construction that used the same 
evidence to declare the Individual Mandate both a tax for the purposes of the 
Constitution but not a tax in regard to the Anti-Injunction Act was erroneous 
“verbal wizardry.”248 
The issue of universal healthcare itself became particularly relevant and 
controversial in the 2012 election cycle,249 and in spite of the President’s re-
election many Republicans continue to oppose the Act as a matter of policy and 
political doctrine.250  There was substantial expectation that the Court would strike 
down the case in its entirety, and its failure to do so was regarded by some as a 
failure to properly comport itself in the “political” process.251  The Chief Justice 
especially has received a great deal of negative attention for his role in deciding the 
case.252  Further, there is substantial dissatisfaction with the Court as a whole for a 
decision that many feel neglects their proper role as the ultimate decision-making 
body.253  However, the majority clearly states the Court’s opinion that, should 
legislation be Constitutional, the Court ought not properly interfere.254  The 
majority stated that the Court was not meant to stand as a bulwark between the 
people and the fruits of their political decisions, good or bad.255 
 
 245. Id. at 2655. 
 246. See id. 132 S. Ct. at 2655. 
 247. See 2655–56. 
 248. Id. at 2656.  
 249. See Kate Pickert, What Obama’s Re-election Means for Health Care, TIME.COM (Nov. 9, 
2012, 7:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/09/health/obama-reelection-healthcare-time/ 
(explaining how the results of the 2012 election would impact the health care system, as Mitt 
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 250. See Anne-Laure Beaussier, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: The Victory 
of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 741, 747 (2012). 
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(“The decision stunned legal observers on both sides . . . .”). 
 252. See id. (“Roberts [was] the focus of heated invective from conservative activists and some 
Republican members of Congress, who derided him as a ‘traitor.’”). 
 253. Id. 
 254. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012). 
 255. Id. at 2579. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION WITH RESPECT TO THE 
ACT’S IMPLEMENTATION 
After the Court’s decision, there is no question that the Act was impacted.  
The question in relation to the Individual Mandate is precisely how.256  It is 
arguable that there now essentially is no legal mandate, and possible that the Act’s 
goal of increased insurance participation will now not be met.  If so, there may be 
further healthcare legislation under the taxing power or an unexpected response by 
HHS.  The public perception of the Court’s decision is also a key component.  
A. Is There Really Still a Legal Individual Mandate  
Requiring the Purchase of Health Insurance? 
In reviewing the shared responsibility payment penalty, the Supreme Court 
noted that for most individuals the amount due under the penalty will be 
significantly less than the price of acquiring health insurance coverage since the 
penalty was capped.257  As a result, the Court believed an individual could make the 
“reasonable” financial decision to pay the penalty instead of purchasing health 
insurance.258  The Court did not believe the “tax,” as it labeled the penalty, 
restricted the lawful choice of an individual on whether to partake or forgo in the 
activity subject to it.259  The Court’s ultimate reading of the Individual Mandate 
was that it was only imposing a tax on individuals without health insurance and 
was reasonable under the taxing power.260  Basically, in the Court’s eyes, those 
individuals subject to the Individual Mandate have two choices: (1) buy health 
insurance and pay lower taxes, or (2) not buy health insurance and pay higher 
taxes.261 
There are some who now argue that the Court’s taxing power ruling 
essentially removes the “mandate” from the Act’s Individual Mandate requirement 
in that the provisions requiring minimum coverage no longer exist as a direct legal 
command to individuals to purchase health insurance.262  This would be based on 
the view that the legal command compelling individuals to buy health insurance 
 
 256. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence: “Reasonable Interpretation” and the 
Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 118–19 (2012) (arguing that the fate of the 
Affordable Care Act after Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius was a factor of which opinion 
controlled, and that the Chief Justice’s commanding interpretation upheld “most of the law”). 
 257. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96. 
 258. Id. at 2596. 
 259. See id. (describing a penalty as a punishment and a tax as a means of influencing 
decisions, but not actually mandating one way or the other by imposing punitive sanctions). 
 260. Id. at 2597. 
 261. See id. at 2593–94. 
 262. See, e.g., The Tax Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Democrats’ Health 
Care Law: Hearing Before the H. Ways and Means Comm. 112th Cong. 7 (2012) (testimony of 
Steven G. Bradbury). 
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was lost on the defeat of the Court’s Commerce Clause holding.263  Such 
commentators point to the Court’s decision as reading the mandate language out of 
the statute.264  Their argument basically states that instead of declaring that 
individuals “shall” maintain health insurance coverage, the Act is now rewritten 
that individuals “should try to” maintain health insurance coverage.265  These 
commentators claim that what is left of the Individual Mandate is solely a tax 
assessment—if you go without health insurance, the Government will tax you 
more.266  In fact, this was the Government’s reading of the statute under the taxing 
power clause as not an order, but a tax on those who do not purchase the product, in 
this case health insurance.267  The result is a tax on inaction by an individual.268  
The importance of this classification is discussed later in Part V. 
One may think that the Government, or specifically the IRS, as the designated 
enforcer of the Individual Mandate provisions, may take some issue with those that 
believe the Individual Mandate has been gutted.  The requirement that an individual 
“shall” ensure that he or she and their dependents have minimum essential coverage 
is contained in the Code.269  The term “shall” in a traditional legal definition is 
mandatory in nature and means an obligation or direction to do something.270  The 
IRS generally views the term “shall” when used in the Code as also meaning 
“must.”271  However, a closer review reveals that, in certain circumstances, 
particularly with respect to individuals, the use of the term “shall” in a statute, such 
as the Code, can be interpreted to mean “may.”272  Courts have noted that in cases 
where the true intent of a statutory provision is required to be interpreted, the use of 
the term “shall” can be viewed as permissive in the sense of “may.”273  This would 
provide some additional support for the argument of a weakened Individual 
Mandate if the Court has really set the bar with a “may” or “should” standard to 
individuals to obtain health insurance.  The IRS and HHS may also have to now 
 
 263. See id. at 3–4. 
 264. See, e.g., id. at 4 (arguing that the Court’s interpretation of the statute renders the 
Individual Mandate without any “substantive meaning separate from the tax penalty”). 
 265. Id. at 7.  
 266. See, e.g., id. 
 267. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–94 (2012).  
 268. See id. at 2590. 
 269. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. V 2012). 
 270. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “shall” as “hav[ing] a duty 
to” in a “mandatory sense”). 
 271. See Gertrude Block, Language for Lawyers, FED. LAW. 62, 62 (Oct. 2011), available at 
http://www.fedbar.org/Federal-Lawyer-Magazine/2011/October/Departments/Language-for-
Lawyers.aspx. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See Cairo & F. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168, 170 (1877) (“As against the Government, 
the word ‘shall,’ when used in statutes, is to be construed as ‘may,’ unless a contrary intention is 
manifest.”); see also Nw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 254 (N.D. 1960) (noting that 
when the word “shall” is “used in constitutions and statutes,” it is read as mandatory, “but where it 
is necessary to give effect to the intent the word will be construed as ‘may’”).     
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interpret the Individual Mandate requirement as merely a policy of encouragement 
of behavior and a trigger of only a different tax rate for individuals depending on 
how they behave.  Broad authority was given to such agencies for issuing 
regulatory guidance under the Act274 and this interpretation may impact the type of 
guidance. 
More precisely, perhaps the result is that it is not unlawful now to not buy 
health insurance, but instead is just a “suggestion” for individuals that they can 
lawfully choose to ignore.  It is only unlawful for an individual to not buy health 
insurance and not pay the resulting tax increase.275  As a consequence, there is 
justification to the claim that the Individual Mandate as a requirement no longer 
exists since the Individual Mandate is now limited by its classification as a “tax” by 
the Court.  It does not require individuals to purchase anything, only suggests what 
individuals should do if they don’t want to pay a higher tax.  It may be a fine line, 
however, to say that the Individual Mandate has no component that compels.  One 
could argue that the weakened Individual Mandate may actually now “compel” 
more individuals into greater inaction with respect to health insurance after making 
a reasonable financial decision and choice on the matter to not obtain coverage.  
Although the Individual Mandate is predicted to motivate the largest portion of the 
population to purchase healthcare, approximately thirty million individuals will 
likely remain uninsured regardless of the changes to the Act (such as the Medicaid 
Expansion and the Employer Mandate).276  A portion of these individuals will 
certainly choose to remain uninsured voluntarily.   
B. Implementation: Where the Act Stands  
Two Years After the Court’s Decision 
Two years after the Supreme Court’s decision, many parts of the Act still 
remain uncertain.  Many employers and individuals waited to see the outcome of 
the Supreme Court’s decision before taking action in anticipation of the Act.277  
Many of those same employers and individuals then waited for the outcome of the 
 
 274. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (P.L. 111-148), CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Apr. 13, 2010) (noting that 
Congress has given regulatory agencies much discretion because the heads of those agencies have 
the broad authority to “prescribe such regulations as may be necessary”). 
 275. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012) (noting that the 
Individual Mandate does not attach negative legal consequences for not purchasing health 
insurance beyond the required payment to the IRS, which is not a “punitive sanction”). 
 276. See UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 3 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter UPDATED 
ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE], available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-13-Coverage%20Estimates.pdf 
(estimating around 26 to 27 million nonelderly residents will remain uninsured after 2016). 
 277. See, e.g., NFIB v. Kathleen Sebelius and its Impact on Employers: Healthcare Reform 
Revisited, NEW ENGLAND COUNCIL (2012), available at http://newenglandcouncil.com/assets/ 
HC-Update-Impact-of-ACA-ruling-on-Employers-07-05-12.pdf. 
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2012 elections.278  Some have continued to wait for guidance as to how to proceed, 
but because the Act is such a massive undertaking the federal government has been 
slow to develop regulations needed for implementation.279  This has caused greater 
uncertainty, leaving employers unprepared and in part necessitating the delay in the 
Employer Mandate.280  While some states prepare to implement the Medicaid 
Expansion voluntarily, others have chosen different routes, and the impact on the 
healthcare market is notable.281  As the IRS prepares to implement the first scaled 
tax penalty for the 2014 tax year, recent studies estimate that more and more people 
will likely remain without health insurance after the Act’s full implementation.282  
Although numbers are in flux, the loss of almost half of the Act’s originally 
anticipated patient population has caused volatility in the healthcare market and has 
in some cases paradoxically caused insurance prices to increase dramatically.283  
Additionally, economists estimate that the classification of the Individual Mandate 
as a tax, in combination with the rate increases due partially to the voluntary nature 
of the Medicaid Expansion and the resultant decrease in the insurance population, 
is unlikely to result in increased insurance enrollment.284   
 
 
 278. See Cancelosi, supra note 4, at 569–70 (discussing the uncertainty faced by employers 
during the 2012 elections). 
 279. See, e.g., Mike Dorning & Alex Wayne, Health-Law Employer Mandate Delayed by U.S. 
Until 2015, BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2013, 7:51 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-
02/health-law-employer-mandate-said-to-be-delayed-to-2015.html (discussing the Obama 
administration’s decision to delay implementation of the Employer Mandate until reporting 
requirements and regulations are finalized). 
 280. See id. (quoting Randy Johnson, Senior Vice President at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce) (“[E]mployers need more time and clarification of the rules of the road before 
implementing the employer mandate.”). 
 281. See KATIE KEITH & KEVIN W. LUCIA, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: THE STATE OF THE STATES 14 ( 2014), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2014/Jan/Implementing-the-
Affordable-Care-Act.aspx (finding, in a state-by-state analysis, that more than half the states will 
expand their Medicaid programs, and about eighteen states will not pass new laws or regulations 
on insurance market reforms under the ACA). 
 282. See ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 3 (citing estimates 
that predict more people will be uninsured as an effect of the ACA).  
 283. See, e.g., Avik Roy, How Obamacare Dramatically Increases The Cost of Insurance for 
Young Workers, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2012, 1:32 PM) (highlighting that in three states, premiums 
will actually increase for individuals as a result of the ACA). 
 284. See Benjamin D. Sommers & Arnold M. Epstein, Medicaid Expansion – The Soft 
Underbelly of Health Care Reform?, NEW ENG. J. MED. 2085, 2085 (2010) (noting that Medicaid 
expansion and increased eligibility for health insurance “does  not always translate into actual 
enrollment”); see also CONNOR RYAN & CHRIS HOLT, TO BUY OR NOT TO BUY: UNINSURED 
YOUNG ADULTS AND THE PERVERSE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 
AMERICAN ACTION FORUM (Jan. 22, 2014), available at http://americanactionforum.org/uploads/ 
files/research/To_Buy_or_Not_to_Buy_-_FINAL.pdf (arguing that young people are “financially 
incentivized to forego health insurance”).  
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C. Possible Negative Impact on Goals and Objectives  
of the Act’s Individual Mandate 
The Individual Mandate’s goal of adding more people into the insurance 
market, when accomplished, positively impacts the premium levels and stability of 
the non-group and small group insurance markets.285  Millions more people added 
to the insurance markets could bring market changes benefiting the consumer.286  If 
these people for some reason choose not to join the market by not complying with 
the Individual Mandate, there will be a direct consequence to the markets and a 
corresponding loss of potential beneficial changes.  This is a threat particularly 
notable in regard to young individuals who may be more willing to dismiss the 
Individual Mandate requirement or any moral persuasion because of the Court’s 
interpretation and other factors.287  It is not an easy task to predict how many of that 
group of uninsured will ultimately obtain health insurance, pay the penalty, or do 
nothing.   
A variety of factors will impact who of this group of uninsured would choose 
to pay the penalty rather than obtain health insurance.  These include (1) moral 
factors, (2) the lack of a legal command, (3) public response, (4) how the penalty is 
labeled, and (5) employer response. 
1.  Moral Factors 
A variable that is present in any analysis of the goals and objectives of the  
Individual Mandate is the impact of any moral persuasion the Individual Mandate 
has on individuals to have health insurance in order to satisfy the Individual 
Mandate and not pay a penalty.288  In the tax compliance world, the model of moral 
persuasion assumes compliance is gained when the governmental or taxing agency 
appeals to the individual taxpayer’s morale because the individual has a moral and 
social obligation to comply.289  It is likely that Congress had used the penalty 
provision in the Individual Mandate and even the word “penalty” to try and better 
 
 285. See LINDA BLUMBERG ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IN PERSPECTIVE, URBAN 
INSTITUTE 2 (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412533-the-individual-
mandate.pdf. 
 286. See id. 
 287. See Grant Bosse, Obamacare’s Problems are More Than Just the Website, CONCORD 
MONITOR (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.concordmonitor.com/home/9049657-95/grant-bosse-
obamacares-problems-are-more-than-just-a-website (noting that healthy young people did not 
purchase health insurance to the same degree as the general population prior to Obamacare, and 
may find it financially advantageous to pay the penalty rather than buy health insurance). 
 288. See Nicholas Bagley & Jill R. Horwitz, Why It’s Called the Affordable Care Act, 110 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/bagleyhorwitz.pdf (arguing that the 
implementation of the Act reflects a national moral choice to provide more affordable and 
available health insurance). 
 289. See Barak Ariel, Deterrence and Moral Persuasion Effects on Corporate Tax 
Compliance: Findings from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28 (2012). 
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achieve the objectives of the Act by causing uninsured individuals to procure health 
insurance.290  A morally persuasive underpinning was present in the Individual 
Mandate provision from its beginning. Assuming that the Supreme Court’s “tax” 
classification and decision has weakened the Individual Mandate to a mere 
suggestion for individuals,291 the impact of any moral persuasion may now be less 
significant and less likely to cause insurance purchases.  It was not the goal of 
Congress to have a large group of individuals, after full implementation of the Act, 
continue to go without health insurance and pay more in taxes,292 yet that may now 
be an indirect consequence of the Court’s decision.   
2.  Lack of Legal Command 
Some observers now conclude that because of the lack of a “legal command” 
to buy health insurance, as previously discussed, there is a concern that the 
Individual Mandate will not fulfill the function that it was intended to do.293  
Without a direct legal mandate to buy health insurance or a perceived risk of being 
in violation of federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and conveyed to the 
public, the question is now whether this interpretation will cause more of an 
increase in the number of individuals electing to pay the tax instead of buying 
health insurance than was originally projected.  The argument is premised on the 
theory that if it was a true legal mandate, individuals would perhaps tend to morally 
have a greater desire to comply with the Individual Mandate and purchase the 
required health insurance.294  Individuals previously projected to obtain health 
insurance because of the Individual Mandate’s “requirement” and penalty features 
may not be so morally compelled with the Supreme Court’s softer version of the 
Individual Mandate and its “tax” classification.  Both before and after the Court’s 
decision, the dollar cost for individuals of the tax penalty would be less than the 
dollar cost of actually purchasing individual health insurance.295  For many 
 
 290. See Edward White, Supreme Court Exceeded Authority Rewriting the ACA, JURIST (July 
21, 2012, 10:07 AM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/07/edward-white-aca-rewrite.php (asserting 
that Congress intentionally used the word penalty because it was not trying to raise revenue 
through the mandate as a tax, but was rather trying to push individuals towards purchasing health 
care). 
 291. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2651 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that labeling the mandate as a “tax” instead of a “penalty” trivializes the Act). 
 292. See Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, supra note 38 (listing the ACA’s three main goals as 
decreasing cost of health care, improving quality of health care, and making health care more 
accessible). 
 293. See The Tax Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Democrats’ Health Care 
Law: Hearing Before the H. Ways and Means Comm. 112th Cong. 8 (2012) (testimony of Steven 
G. Bradbury). 
 294. See id. at 9. 
 295. See supra text accompanying note 77 (noting that the total penalty cannot exceed the 
average national cost of a bronze plan offered through the exchange). 
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individuals cost may be a more (or perhaps the most) important factor now as they 
weigh the moral factor, if at all, on whether to obtain health insurance.  
3.  Public Response 
The CBO, after the Supreme Court’s decision was released, issued an update 
on their estimates regarding the impact of the Act’s insurance provisions.296  
Interestingly, the CBO did not substantially change their estimate of the impact of 
the Individual Mandate and penalty provision on individuals and their likelihood to 
acquire health insurance or pay the penalty.297  The percentages remained relatively 
the same.298  The CBO’s analysis was based on a comparison with other types of 
taxes and penalties and general compliance by the public with those other 
provisions.299  Based on that information, the CBO did believe and still apparently 
believes that even after the Court’s decision that individual behavior would be the 
same and that people would perceive the Individual Mandate as a “requirement” to 
purchase health insurance.300  It is apparently an embedded behavioral response of 
people of either fulfilling their “civic” duty or having a fear of an IRS penalty that 
creates this behavior.  However, it is not elaborated upon any further by the 
CBO.301  It is unclear whether either the “civic duty” motivation or the penalty 
motivation is likely to produce the CBO’s expected results.  Interestingly, the most 
recent estimates from the CBO show a changing behavioral response of less people 
tilting to paying the penalty: estimated revenue from penalty collections from 
2016−2022 has decreased from $55 billion in 2012302 to $32 billion in 2014.303 
At the time the Individual Mandate was moving through the legislative phase, 
there were a wide variety of opinions on how the public would react to the 
 
 296. ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 14. 
 297. See id. at 3, 14. 
 298. See id. at 14 (noting that after the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
ACA’s Individual Mandate, the CBO and JCT did not change their estimates on the mandate’s 
effect on coverage); see also id. at 18 tbl.1, 19 tbl.2, 20 tbl.3 (estimating the impact of the 
Supreme Court’s decision on insurance coverage).  
 299. See ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 14 (noting CBO 
and JCT’s earlier approximations of the mandate’s impact on people’s decisions to obtain 
insurance were based on tax compliance literature and  assessment of the strength of incentives, 
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13, 16–20, 24–25 (assessing the impact of the Individual Mandate on coverage by examining other 
federal and state mandates and tax compliance generally). 
 300. See ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 3. 
 301. See id. at 3. 
 302. See PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT, supra note 84, at 1. 
 303. See INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 
149. 
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Individual Mandate, ranging from the Individual Mandate strongly encouraging 
more people to buy health insurance to actually causing people to forgo buying 
insurance in favor of paying the penalty because the cost of the penalty was less 
than the insurance cost.304  Many studies of mandates on citizens look to three 
disciplines in estimating the impact a mandate has on individual decisions, the first 
being health economics and the other two being tax compliance and behavioral 
economics.305  The CBO had concluded, based on this type of analysis, that the 
Individual Mandate would indeed increase insurance coverage among the 
population.306  The CBO reasoned that although paying the penalty may, in direct 
dollars, cost less that the insurance premium, people who do buy insurance receive 
a benefit or return on their investment in the form of health insurance which the 
penalty does not provide.307  In the process of weighing which choice provides a 
better outcome or value for individuals, the CBO factored in economics and 
determined that people tend to respond more affirmatively than negatively because 
of the lower cost of compliance combined with benefit.308  In addition, the decision 
will likely be influenced by several intangible factors reviewed by the CBO, such 
as social norms and moral behavior.309 
4.  The Label Analysis 
After the Court’s decision, the Individual Mandate still seems to remain 
unpopular among certain groups regardless of whether the shared responsibility 
payment is labeled a “penalty” or “tax.”  One of the more interesting surveys that 
came out after the Court’s decision was a poll done by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation on the number of people expected to pay the shared responsibility  
payment penalty when it is defined as a “tax” as opposed to a “fine.”310  When 
asked if they expected to have to pay a “fine” when the Individual Mandate takes 
effect, 12% expected to pay the fine while the rest would presumably comply with 
the Individual Mandate through current or new insurance coverage.311  When a 
different group of individuals were instead asked if they expected to have to pay a 
“tax” when the Individual Mandate takes effect, 26% expected to pay the tax with 
 
 304. See Auerbach et al., supra note 83, at 1–2. 
 305. See id. at 2 (stating that in the absence of empirical evidence, research from health 
economics, tax compliance, and behavioral economics may provide perspective on the 
consequence of the Individual Mandate). 
 306. Id. at 25.  
 307. Id. at 13. 
 308. See id. at 25. 
 309. See id.  
 310. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: PUBLIC OPINION ON 
HEALTH CARE ISSUES 6 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/ 
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the remainder presumably having or planning on acquiring health insurance.312  
Classifying the shared responsibility payment as a “tax” rather than a “fine” 
apparently caused more than twice as many people to respond that they would pay 
it and forgo obtaining health insurance coverage.313   
What may be missing from the label analysis, however, is the moral factor 
regarding whether individuals may be motivated by doing what is right.314  If the 
message is conveyed to individuals in a manner that encourages moral action, it 
could tip the scale back to compliance with the Individual Mandate.  The optics, 
however, could easily suggest that as a result of the Court’s classification of the 
penalty as a “tax” and the way the Individual Mandate is conveyed to the public in 
the next few years, there could be an even greater number of people putting a lower 
emphasis on the Individual Mandate’s implicit requirement and not acquiring 
health insurance.  Some in that group would opt to pay the tax penalty, but others 
could ignore both the Individual Mandate requirement and the tax penalty to create 
an even worse scenario: individuals that will not comply or pay the penalty for 
failure.   
5.  Employer Response 
Another interesting variable is how many employers will respond to the Act’s 
insurance coverage provisions—specifically, what weight will employers give to 
the moral desire of employees to have health insurance to satisfy the Individual 
Mandate?  Studies suggest that as employers place decreased weight on an 
employee’s desire for health insurance under the Individual Mandate, the number 
of people whose employers are projected to stop offering health insurance coverage 
in response to the Act increases.315  By increasing the weight that employers place 
on an employee’s desire for health insurance, it “decreases the number of people 
whose employers are projected to stop offering coverage” in response to the Act.316  
The CBO had earlier projected that the Individual Mandate with its penalty 
provision would lead to more employees seeking health insurance coverage.317  As 
a result, there would be a greater demand for health insurance and an increased 
incentive for employers to offer health insurance to attract and retain employees.318  
 
 312. Id. 
 313. See id. 
 314. See, e.g., Janet Dolgin & Katherine Dietrich, Social And Legal Debate About The 
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The taxing power decision of the Court and the optics of a “tax” as opposed to a 
penalty fine may distort that outcome.  Will employers now view the Individual 
Mandate as carrying less of a “stick” in regard to its potential consequences for 
individuals?  If so, will that minimize the weight those employers would otherwise 
place on the moral desire of their employees and potential employees to have health 
insurance?  As a result, a consequence of the Court’s decision may be that less 
employers offer health insurance coverage, and thus that their employees must 
either go into market themselves or pay the tax. 
D. Could Further Legislation be Possible Under the Taxing Power if the        
Goal of Having More Insureds Under the Act is Not Met? 
The economic reality of the Court’s decision may be the opposite of what 
Congress intended if more individuals forgo buying health insurance than 
previously projected and a void is created.  The shift of labels from a penalty to a 
“tax” by the Court’s decision could be a determinative factor in any increase in the 
number of people in each of several subgroups.  Those subgroups include (i) 
individuals opting to pay the penalty because the tax owed will be less than the cost 
of health insurance coverage, (ii) individuals adopting a public view that the only 
consequence of not buying insurance is a little more tax owed, or (iii) individuals 
minimizing any moral obligation to buy health insurance.  
Some have predicted that Congress or the Administration could, in the future, 
try to increase the dollar amount of the shared responsibility payment penalty to 
push individuals back from the non-compliant end of the spectrum and on to the 
health insurance purchaser side.319  It is not known how high the amount of the tax 
penalty could go before crossing the line into a true penalty and punitive territory.  
The argument made by those concerned is that individuals could be “coerced” into 
the health insurance market due to higher tax cost consequences in the future.320  
The fact that this is considered to be an available tool is interesting, although there 
is room for debate as to whether such legislation could pass Congress.  Research 
does suggest that the size of the penalty is one factor that will increase the number 
of individuals that comply with the Individual Mandate and obtain coverage.321  
 
 319. See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, How the Supreme Court Doomed the ACA to Failure, 35 
REG. 32, 35 (2013) (suggesting that proponents of the Act in Congress likely planned on raising 
the Individual Mandate penalty once the law went into effect in order to increase compliance). 
 320. See Jeffrey H. Anderson, Taking Aim at Obamacare’s Coercive Core, THE WEEKLY 
STANDARD (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/taking-aim-obamacare-s-
coercive-core_757288.html (arguing that an estimated 40% of the ACA enrollment may be 
attributable to coercion from the Individual Mandate). 
 321. See David Auerbach et. al., supra note 83, at 2–3 (explaining that research suggests that 
the success of mandates may be contingent on the size of the penalty relative to the cost of 
compliance); see also Sherry A. Glied et al., Consider It Done? The Likely Efficacy Of Mandates 
For Health Insurance, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1612, 1618 (2007) (noting that the effectiveness of 
obedience to mandates increases  relative to the fine, but only up to a certain point).  
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Nevertheless, the Court was firm in its position that the extension of the penalizing 
features of a tax can cause it to become a mere penalty and that the “power to tax is 
not the power to destroy.”322  The Court, however, did not believe that it was the 
appropriate time to further decide at what point the Individual Mandate tax crossed 
the line into a punitive penalty.323  It is hard to see that there is much room for any 
movement of the Individual Mandate penalty cost that would not run afoul of the 
Constitutional limitations raised by the Court. 
The Court did not believe that the shared responsibility payment crossed the 
line to become an actual penalty and solely a tool to punish for several reasons.324  
The “tax” characteristics of the shared responsibility payment penalty remain 
within the parameters of the Court’s practical definition of a tax.325  The process of 
the payment of the shared responsibility payment penalty via payment with one’s 
tax return, the calculation of the payment based on taxable income, dependents and 
filing status, and enforcement by the IRS demonstrated for the Court a payment 
that looks and acts like a “tax.”326  Labels of exactions are not fatal according to the 
Court, at least with respect to the exercise of Congress’s taxing power, and the 
Court was adamant that labels not control in this case.327  While Congress could 
attempt to motivate a shift from the uninsured pool to the insured pool by further 
increasing the amount of the penalty or increasing the IRS’s enforcement tools, 
such actions would clearly be problematic under the Court’s taxing power holding.   
The CBO predicted that the IRS’s ability to require tax reporting from 
individuals and insurance companies in order to match up data of those with 
insurance coverage would result in a higher rate of compliance with the Individual 
Mandate than without such an enforcement tool.328  The use of such matching 
programs by the IRS in other tax areas tends to result in greater compliance.329  The 
IRS, by utilizing additional information reporting and matching programs to 
determine compliance along with the penalty, could increase the incentive for 
people to comply with an Individual Mandate.  The broad regulatory authority 
 
 322. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 323. See id. (arguing that because the mandate is currently within the narrow limits of a tax, it 
is currently not necessary for the Court to decide at what point the mandate would be prohibited 
under the taxing power). 
 324. See id. at 2599–600. 
 325. See id. at 2600. 
 326. See id. at 2594. 
 327. See id. at 2597–98. 
 328. See Auerbach et al., supra note 83, at 18 (finding that the IRS’s enforcement of the ACA’s 
Individual Mandate would “yield higher rates of compliance” using information-reporting and 
data matching programs as compared to penalties alone). 
 329. See id. at 18 (noting higher tax compliance rates when the IRS uses third-party data 
matching systems). 
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given under the Act to the IRS330 may be an avenue for such action.  Following the 
Court’s decision, there has been some concern that Congress could avail itself of 
additional tax enforcement mechanisms, including criminal prosecution, tax audits, 
liens, etc., to create greater compliance with the Individual Mandate.331  Studies 
suggest that increasing the likelihood that a penalty will be levied and collected via 
enforcement increases the incentive for individuals to comply with the law.332  The 
IRS’s general enforcement reputation is another factor that could increase 
compliance with the Individual Mandate.   
The Court cautioned that the taxing power does not allow Congress the same 
degree of control over the particular individual subject to it.333  An individual who 
disobeys a regulation that is constitutional under the Commerce Clause may be 
subject to a full range of consequences, including criminal sanctions and loss of 
certain rights.334  Under the taxing power, an individual is required to pay money to 
the IRS as a consequence of not taking the designated action and, if the “tax” is 
properly paid, the Government cannot punish the individual any further.335  It is 
noteworthy that the Court also stated that “individuals do not have a lawful choice 
not to pay a tax due” and can in some cases “face prosecution for failing to do 
so.”336  However, this is not true in the case of the shared responsibility payment 
penalty where criminal prosecution is not currently allowed under the Act for 
failure to pay.337  If further legislation was proposed to add tax enforcement 
mechanisms, including criminal prosecution, to create greater compliance with the 
Individual Mandate and to increase the number of insureds, this would likely 
invalidate the Individual Mandate under the taxing power. 
 
 330. See id. (noting that under the ACA, the IRS could combine penalties with matching 
programs to increase compliance); The IRS and its 46 New Powers to Enforce ObamaCare, 
GALEN INST. (June 5, 2013), http://www.galen.org/2013/46-new-irs-powers-to-enforce-
obamacare (noting the unprecedented power granted to the IRS through forty six new powers 
under the ACA).  But see Jordan M. Barry & Bryan T. Camp, Is the Individual Mandate Really 
Mandatory?, 135 TAX NOTES 1633, 1638 (2012) (noting that while the ACA authorizes the IRS to 
administer and collect the Individual Mandate broadly “in the same manner as an assessable 
penalty,” the ACA significantly limits the tools the IRS can use to collect the Individual Mandate 
as compared to other taxes). 
 331. IRS May Be Unable To Enforce The ACA's Individual Mandate, ADVISORY BD. CO. (May 
15, 2014),  http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2013/10/31/irs-may-be-unable-to-enforce-the-
aca-individual-mandate; John DiMugno, Navigating Health Care Reform: The Supreme Court's 
Ruling and the Choppy Waters Ahead, 24 Cal. Ins. L.  & Reg. Rep. 1 (2012).  
 332. See Auerbach et al., supra note 85, at 18. 
 333. Nat’l. Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012). 
 334. See id. (noting that under the Commerce Clause, Congress can subject an individual to 
various sanctions, including criminal prosecution and deprivation of civil rights). 
 335. See id. 
 336. Id. at 2600 n.11.  
 337. See id. at 2597 (finding that neither the Act nor any other law creates an allowance for 
criminal prosecution for not buying health insurance). 
	   	  
260 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 17 
E. Impact of Waivers Granted to Individuals in States that                           
Refuse to Participate in the Expansion of Medicaid 
As discussed, the number of newly insured predicted under the Act has 
become a slippery number as a result of the Court’s decision.338  For example, 
many of these individuals will have income that falls below the filing thresholds.339  
Others will be exempt because they would have to pay more than 8% of their 
income for health insurance.340  Finally, some of these individuals are likely to 
receive a hardship exemption from HHS.341 
The issuance of the hardship exemptions by HHS raises an interesting 
question as to whether a larger involvement of HHS with the Individual Mandate 
impacts the “tax” classification of the penalty that was addressed by the Court.  In 
order for the Court to reach its taxing power position it looked to the agency that 
essentially was involved in the administration of the penalty (tax).342  In this case 
the IRS was the sole agency viewed by the Court.343  If HHS takes on a bigger and 
more influential role with the Individual Mandate in deciding who is exempt and 
who is not exempt, it could result in the Individual Mandate provision becoming 
more regulatory or punitive and convert the tax back into a penalty classification. 
F. Reaction to the Taxing Power Argument 
The Court’s conclusion in National Federation was poorly received by many, 
especially Republicans and legal conservatives.344  There was substantial 
expectation that the Court would strike down the case in its entirety, and its failure 
to do so was regarded by some as a failure to properly comport itself in the 
“political” process.345  The Chief Justice especially has received a great deal of 
 
 338. See supra Parts IV.B, IV.C.3. (discussing how many employers and individuals waited for 
the Court’s decision before taking any action, and the CBO’s analyses in predicting how the 
Court’s decision would impact an individual’s likelihood to acquire health insurance or pay the 
penalty, respectively). 
 339. See ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 4, 16. 
 340. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2012) (exempting individuals whose coverage for 
the month exceeds 8% of their household income for the taxable year). 
 341. See id. § 5000A(e)(5). 
 342. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (discussing how the IRS will collect the 
payment through its means of taxation).  
 343. See id. (discussing how the IRS is the sole agency that collects the payment).  
 344. See Bill Mears & Tom Cohen, Emotions High After Supreme Court Upholds Health Care 
Law, CNN (June 28, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/politics/supreme-court-health-ruling/ 
(reporting that many Republicans criticized the Court’s holding and vowed to repeal the Act). 
 345. See John S. Hoff, Obamacare: Chief Justice Robert’s Political Doge, 18 INDEP. REV. 5, 5 
(2013) (arguing that the Court’s decision was one of several “rule-bending steps” taken to protect 
the ACA, and that the Court has stretched its boundaries and failed to adhere to the political 
process).  See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Chief Justice Robert’s Individual Mandate: The Lawless 
Medicine of NFIB v. Sebelius, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 15, 15 (2013) (discussing how many in the 
legal world were shocked by the outcome of National Federation). 
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negative attention for his role in deciding the case.346  As a Justice who is popularly 
identified as a judicial conservative appointed by a conservative Republican 
president, there was a public expectation (if not hope within conservative circles) 
that he would be more inclined to strike down the case than uphold it.347  The issue 
of universal healthcare itself had become particularly relevant and controversial 
given it was an election year, and many Republicans opposed the Act as a matter of 
policy and political doctrine.348   
Because of this controversy, it is surprising that the decision as a whole seems 
to be an exercise in legal moderation—that is, adherence to judicial restraint and 
avoidance.  This is in keeping with the Chief Justice’s judicial philosophy, and 
might have been more foreseeable from him than a strong political stance.349  
Nonetheless, many conservatives hold him personally accountable for failing to 
uphold a Constitutional interpretation more similar to their own.350  Further, there is 
substantial dissatisfaction with the Court as a whole for a decision that many feel 
neglects their proper role as the ultimate decision-making body.351  However, the 
opinion clearly states the Court’s opinion that, should legislation be Constitutional, 
the Court ought not properly interfere.352  The Chief Justice, for the majority, stated 
 
 346. See, e.g., Magarian, supra note 345, at 15 (discussing how Justice Robert’s leadership role 
in National Federation left Republicans “fuming”). 
 347. See id. (discussing how despite popular belief, Chief Justice John Roberts surprised 
conservatives and liberals by upholding the constitutionality of the ACA); see also Hoff, supra 
note 345, at 5 (discussing how Chief Justice Roberts “surprised practically everyone” by being the 
swing vote to uphold the constitutionality of the ACA). 
 348. See generally Ezra Klein, Do Republicans Really Want Universal Health Care, 
BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-27/do-republicans-
really-want-universal-health-care-.html (discussing that in post-ACA elections, voters would have 
to choose between one party that supported universal health care and one that did not). 
 349. See John Dean, Why Chief Justice Roberts Dared Not Overturn President Obama’s 
Healthcare Plan, JUSTIA (June 29, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/29/why-chief-justice-
roberts-dared-not-overturn-president-obamas-healthcare-plan (arguing that although many were 
surprised with Chief Justice’s decision in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, they should not 
have been because his decision was consistent with his philosophy); Stephen M. Feldman, Chief 
Justice Roberts’s Marbury Moment: The Affordable Care Act Case (NFIB v. Sebelius), 13 WYO. 
L. REV. 335, 348 (2013) (noting that in National Federation, Roberts “articulated conservative 
constitutional doctrine”, and urged the Court to decide the case without considering politics). 
 350. See Benjamin Hart, John Roberts Criticism: Conservatives Continue to Attack Justice 
After Health Care Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/29/john-roberts-criticism-continues_n_1637410.html 
(discussing the conservative backlash and criticisms of Chief Justice Roberts in the wake of his 
“surprise majority opinion”); The Roberts Rule: The Chief Justice Rewrites ObamaCare in Order 
to Save It, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304058404577494400059173634 (blaming Chief Justice Roberts for his 
“infinitely elastic” and “dangerous interpretation” of the taxing power). 
 351. See, e.g., Magarian, supra 345, at 16 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’s legal analyses 
neglects the proper role of the Court and exemplifies a sense of lawlessness). 
 352. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012). 
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that the Court was not meant to stand as a bulwark between the people and the 
fruits of their political decisions, good or bad.353 
V. WILL THE COURT’S DECISION OPEN UP THE GATES FOR THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT TO INFLUENCE OTHER ACTIONS/INACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
HEALTHCARE UNDER CONGRESS’S TAXING POWER? 
A. Is There a New Expansion of the Taxing Power? 
One question raised since the Court’s decision came out is whether there has 
been an expansion of Congress’s taxing power.354  With its taxing power argument, 
the Government urged the Court that the Act’s Individual Mandate should be read 
in a different manner.355  Instead of an order to do something (i.e., buy health 
insurance), the Individual Mandate should be interpreted as one that solely imposes 
a tax on individuals who do not buy health insurance or who “do nothing.”356  A 
significant concern for the Court was the issue of whether Congress is permitted to 
impose a tax on individuals who abstain or do nothing.357  It was clear that the 
Court in its Commerce Clause analysis and holding found it unconstitutional for 
Congress to regulate those who do not buy health insurance via a command to buy 
such health insurance.358  Unlike Congress’s power to regulate commerce, 
however, Congress’s taxing power is broad and the question for the Court was not 
whether Congress can tax but whether Congress exercised its taxing power 
properly.359  In a threefold response, the Court found that the Constitution directly 
or indirectly does not permit individuals to avoid taxes through inactivity and 
therefore the use of the taxing power was proper.360   
The decision may not herald an expansion of the taxing power, but it certainly 
confirmed the use of it in situations of inaction by individuals.  The Court noted 
that Congress’s use of its taxing power to encourage buying something is not 
something new.361  Influencing or promoting conduct with tax incentives is not 
uncommon—for example, buying a house with the mortgage interest deduction 
 
 353. See id. 
 354. See Barry Cushman, NFIB v. Sebelius and the Transformation of the Taxing Power, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 197 (2013) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion leaves 
unclear the future of taxing power jurisprudence and the uncertainty of Congress’s ability to use 
its taxing power). 
 355. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593−94. 
 356. See id.  
 357. See Comments, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 72, 76–77 (2012).  
 358. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012). 
 359. See id. at 2599. 
 360. Id. at 2599–600. 
 361. See id. at 2599. 
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incentive.362  To the Court, influencing the purchase of health insurance was no 
different.363  Raising revenue may be the main reason for taxes, but also influencing 
individual conduct may be another purpose (e.g., cigarette taxes to deter 
smoking).364  The Court specifically noted that the Act’s ability to influence 
whether to buy health insurance does not invalidate it under the taxing power.365  
Further, due to the Court’s makeup and analysis of the historical uses of the taxing 
power by Congress, it has been proposed that, “history and pragmatism suggest that 
this case will have a marginal jurisprudential impact.”366  As such, using the taxing 
power to influence behavior does not appear to be an expansion of the taxing power 
by the Court.367   
B. Other Areas to Improve the Nation’s Health—A Tax                                      
on Individuals for Not Eating Their Broccoli? 
In its simplistic form, if an individual does not maintain health insurance 
under the Individual Mandate, the basic consequence is that he or she needs to 
make an additional  payment to the IRS at tax time or, alternatively if the individual 
is due a refund from the IRS, have his or her income tax refund amount decreased 
by the IRS. 368  The Government argued that the inaction of individuals not 
obtaining health insurance is a “condition” triggering a tax payment to the IRS, 
and, like many other “conditions,” can be subject to a tax.369  The Supreme Court 
did not disagree.370  This raises the question as to what other areas could this 
“payment in lieu of” argument for inaction be utilized to improve the nation’s 
health?  It should be put into perspective the claim by some that Congress is now 
able to tax one for the failure to take action in whatever context.   
There seems to be perhaps an understated view from the Court about when 
something is an unlawful activity.  The CBO had predicted that a significant 
number of people will elect to pay a penalty to the IRS instead of paying for health 
insurance, a number which, as earlier discussed, could now be even higher as a 
 
 362. See id. (discussing how Congress has used tax incentives to promote purchasing homes 
and professional educations). 
 363. See id. 
 364. See id. at 2596. 
 365. See id. 
 366. Robert Pushaw & Grant Nelson, The Likely Impact Of National Federation On Commerce 
Clause Jurisprudence, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 979–980 (2013). 
 367. See Mystica M. Alexander & Timothy Gagnon, The Roberts Court: Using The Taxing 
Power To Shape Individual Behavior, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 345, 346 (2012) (arguing that 
the Court’s holding in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius was “not an indefensible stretch” of 
the taxing power as the Act was “simply another use by Congress of the taxing power as a stick to 
regulate individual behavior”). 
 368. See id. at 361−363, 368 (discussing the requirements of the Individual Mandate as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court).  
 369. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593−94. 
 370. See id. at 2593−2594. 
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result of the Court’s decision.371  The Court believed that if such a large number of 
people failing to buy health insurance was acceptable to the Government, their 
inaction could hardly be considered unlawful, but instead is a payment in lieu of 
action.372  The Court noted that the Act does not declare that failing to buy health 
insurance is unlawful.373  If an individual has instead paid the appropriate amount 
to the IRS, he or she has fully complied with the law.374  For the Court, penalties 
equate to punishment for something unlawful and this inaction of not buying health 
insurance and the resulting tax is not a penalty.375   
Is there a legitimate choice between action and inaction in other health areas?  
The Court was clear that the Individual Mandate in effect is just a tax hike on 
certain taxpayers who do not have health insurance.376  Does it make going without 
an annual health examination just another thing the Government can tax?  Where 
does Congress’s constitutional power to tax end?  The majority opinion addresses 
the usage of taxation to influence behavior and its long-standing historical 
precedent.377  So long as a tax is not unnecessarily punitive, or is such that there is 
no feasibly desirable option other than to pay, then taxes as incentives or as 
regulation are acceptable.378  Taxes have long been used to influence behavior such 
as smoking and drinking, or purchasing property.379  The tax on not acquiring 
health insurance is not substantially different. 
The Court’s decision in this case was so dependent on the limited nature of 
the statute, and the limited nature of the taxing power, that it is unlikely that future 
expansion in other areas of health care will follow.  The Chief Justice heavily 
advocated a case-by-case analysis in his opinions, and here the specific facts were 
key in his decision.  Had the penalty (tax) been too large or been enforceable in any 
other context (e.g., criminal or civil liability), then it would likely not have 
succeeded.  The Court clearly noted that punitive actions masquerading as taxes 
would not be permissible.380  Further, the use of labels seems to be made 
insignificant by this case, thus lessening any possibility of avoiding political 
accountability.  If the Court will construe what is labeled a penalty as both a tax 
and not a tax (for Anti-Injunction purposes) based on what it perceives the true 
 
 371. See ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 3 (estimating an 
increase in the number of people uninsured predicted by the CBO in March 2012). 
 372. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597 (2012). 
 373. See id. 
 374. See id. 
 375. See id. at 2596−98. 
 376. See id. at 2594. 
 377. See id. at 2598−600. 
 378. See id. at 2596. 
 379. Id. 
 380. See id. at 2596 (clarifying that while the IRS has the power to tax normally, the IRS 
cannot use taxation as a “punitive sanction”). 
	   	  
2014 TAXING POWER DECISION ON THE GOALS OF THE ACA 265 
nature of the statute to be, then any effort to abuse the taxing power is unlikely to 
be allowed solely on the basis of a label.  
As Justice Scalia pointed out, Congress does have the authority to tax the 
failure to purchase broccoli.381  But the dissent and the Chief Justice seem to agree 
that allowing Congress to tax a failure to purchase, even if it solved a national 
crisis, would impermissibly extend the bounds of Congressional authority.382  
Further, broccoli on the whole is relatively inexpensive.  Any permissible tax 
would have to offer a real choice between owning broccoli and the alternative, as 
the majority interpreted the Individual Mandate to do, and thus as a tax would be 
negligible.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The primary goal of the Individual Mandate is to increase the number of 
individuals in the United States having health insurance.383  When the Act was 
challenged in the courts, the Administration and other supporters of the Act 
believed that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to require or 
compel individuals to purchase health insurance.384  Five members of the Supreme 
Court disagreed with the Administration and found that Congress had no authority 
under the Commerce Clause to impose the Individual Mandate.385  The Individual 
Mandate was, nevertheless, upheld under Congress’s taxing power authority, which 
was viewed by many in the public as a victory for health care reform.386  On closer 
examination, however, the outcome of the decision can perhaps be better 
characterized as creating an unintended obstacle to meeting the overall goals and 
objectives of the Act.387  The lack of a true mandate requiring the purchase of 
 
 381. See id. at 2650 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 382. See id. at 2589 (2012); see also id. at 2650 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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health insurance, because of the Court’s taxing power decision and the “tax” 
classification of the penalty, may likely result in the Individual Mandate not 
fulfilling the function it was intended to do. 
In addition, the Court’s decision that makes the Medicaid Expansion optional 
for states created another obstacle on top of the taxing power “tax” classification, 
as many states will not expand their Medicaid eligibility programs.388  This has 
resulted in projections of a larger number of low-income people without health 
insurance based on the Court’s decision on the Medicaid Expansion.389  Other 
individuals will not carry insurance because of exemptions, or because now they 
believe a better choice is to pay the tax.390  Some may ignore both the Individual 
Mandate and the tax penalty if not persuaded by any moral obligation.  So while 
the Court’s decision may be viewed as a political victory, the decision may actually 
make it more difficult to achieve the Act’s objective of increasing the number of 
insureds in America. 
The Court’s decision is unlikely to create any expansion of Congress’ taxing 
power or open up a new avenue for the Administration or Congress to influence 
other activities with respect to health care under the taxing power.391  However, 
there is still great uncertainty about the future of health care in America.  There are 
still over a dozen lawsuits challenging the provisions of the Act requiring 
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(showcasing the different perspectives of citizens who refuse to get health insurance, choosing to 
pay the penalty instead); Rachael Bade & Brett Norman, Obamacare: Who will ignore law’s 
requirements?, POLITICO (Oct. 13, 2013, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/obamacare-mandate-some-americans-will-ignore-
requirement-98236.html (describing how many feel that it is cheaper to pay the penalty, but that 
what they do not realize is that the penalty will get more expensive each year); Joseph Antos & 
Michael R. Strain, If You Don’t Buy Insurance, Will You Really Pay the Tax?, THE AMERICAN 
(July 17, 2012), http://www.american.com/archive/2012/july/if-you-dont-buy-insurance-will-you-
really-pay-the-tax (stating that many may be exempt from buying health insurance, such as low 
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employers to pay for coverage of certain medical services.392  Additionally, the 
President and Congress will be making significant decisions about reforming 
entitlement programs like Medicare and Medicaid, and reducing the federal 
deficit.393  It is possible that provisions of the Act will be amended as part of a 
grand compromise between our elected branches. 
Furthermore, decisions regarding the expansion of Medicaid coverage and the 
creation of state insurance exchanges will be in the hands of various state officials, 
and this has added to the uncertainty.394  Health care policy has historically been 
negotiated and developed between traditional stakeholders: the carriers and the 
providers.395  Change, while tedious and incremental, was possible.396  Today, as a 
result of the requirements of the Act and the Court’s decision, political forces now 
control the outcome of policy.  These new political forces, such as state governors 
and legislatures, often take radically opposed and extreme views on policy, thus 
making compromise difficult.397  In Texas, for example, every traditional 
participant in the development of health care policy is in favor of Medicaid 
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choice of expanding Medicaid coverage will be up to each state’s governor and state leaders); see 
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Coverage” in Name Only, 2846 BACKGROUNDER 1, 3 (2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
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how state officials are expected to set up required insurance exchanges, but that only seventeen 
states and the District of Columbia plan to facilitate their own exchanges); David K. Jones et al., 
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expansion, as well as many local governments and the business community.398  
However, the political leadership of a conservative governor and a Republican-
controlled legislature have blocked any effort at Medicaid expansion.399  The 
decision by the Court to allow states to opt out of Medicaid expansion has allowed 
similar Republican-controlled state governors and legislatures in other states to 
undermine one of the fundamental components of the Act.400   
The way forward will depend in part upon government policy and political 
outcomes both at the national and state level.  House Republicans have voted 
numerous times to repeal the Act.401  Now they have turned their sights to blocking 
measures that fund the Act.402  This is a risky strategy with the potential for 
troublesome consequences, as evidenced by the government shutdown in 2013.403  
Another problem with this strategy, if successful, is that the Act would continue to 
be the law, but without the funding necessary for the Executive Branch to 
implement and enforce it.  Republicans have, in the past, criticized the President for 
selective enforcement of laws such as immigration.404  This strategy would, in 
essence, make Republicans responsible for a similar selective enforcement should 
the President become unable to implement and enforce due to funding.  
Furthermore, because the Act’s key provisions, such as the Individual Mandate and 
the Employer Mandate, would still be good law, some companies and individuals 
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might continue to try to comply, whereas others may not.  What are employers and 
states to do in such a circumstance?  Contrary to conventional wisdom, with the 
passage of time more questions, not fewer, arise regarding the Act.405  The Supreme 
Court decision answered some questions and raised others.  While it may be 
undebatable that Americans want and need more affordable and better quality 
health care, it is certainly debatable whether or how the goals and objectives of the 
Act can still be met in its current state.   
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